不同权力结构对跨境电商双渠道供应链的影响

发布时间：2018-05-02 14:48

本文选题：双渠道零售 + Stackelberg/Nash博弈　；参考：《系统工程学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：在单个境外供应商和单个拥有线下线上双渠道的跨境电商组成的供应链中,基于消费者剩余理论,构建了跨境电商双渠道需求模型,通过比较集中和分散两种定价模式下跨境电商的利润,探讨了跨境电商双渠道零售模式的定价决策问题.在此基础上,构建境外供应商主导的Stackelberg博弈,跨境电商主导的Stackelberg博弈及同等权力的Nash博弈模型,分析了三种博弈权力结构对供应链成员价格,需求和利润的影响.研究发现,跨境电商(境外供应商)主导的Stackelberg博弈对跨境电商线下线上双渠道价格,需求及供应链总利润的影响是无差异的;三种博弈策略对跨境电商线下渠道需求的影响是无差异的,Nash博弈下,跨境电商线上渠道需求及供应链总利润最大;三种博弈策略下,境外供应商批发价格,利润及跨境电商利润随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低.
[Abstract]:In the supply chain composed of single offshore supplier and single cross-border ecommerce with offline and double channels, based on the theory of consumer surplus, the model of cross-border e-commerce dual channel demand is constructed. By comparing the profit of cross-border ecommerce under centralized and decentralized pricing mode, the pricing decision of cross-border e-commerce dual-channel retail mode is discussed. On this basis, the Stackelberg game led by foreign suppliers, the Stackelberg game dominated by cross-border e-commerce and the Nash game model with the same power are constructed, and the influence of three game power structures on the price, demand and profit of supply chain members is analyzed. It is found that the influence of Stackelberg game dominated by cross-border ecommerce (foreign suppliers) on the price, demand and total profit of supply chain is not different. The influence of the three game strategies on the channel demand under the cross-border e-commerce line is the largest under the similar Nash game, the channel demand and the total profit of the supply chain are the largest in the cross-border e-commerce line, and under the three game strategies, the wholesale price of the overseas suppliers is the largest. Profit and profit of cross-border ecommerce decrease gradually with its dominant position of game.
【作者单位】：大连理工大学系统工程研究所;大连理工大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471025;71171029) 国家社会科学基金资助项目(16CGL016)
【分类号】：F274

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