双重非对称信息下旅游服务供应链中的激励机制设计

发布时间：2018-05-17 10:48

本文选题：委托代理 + 甄别与激励　；参考：《运筹与管理》2013年03期

【摘要】：旅游服务供应链中,旅行社与导游之间的信息非对称而导致的逆向选择和道德风险问题将损害旅行社的利益,因此,如何对导游进行有效甄别与激励是旅行社所要关注的一个重要问题。以导游的服务能力和努力水平两种私有信息不被旅行社所观察到,但其服务业绩可以被观测到为基础,利用博弈论与信息经济学等理论和方法设计了导游的服务能力为连续类型下的激励机制,运用最优化原理得出了最优激励机制参数。结果表明,旅行社应对不同服务能力的导游设计一揽子形式的不同的激励机制。双重非对称信息下的激励机制不仅能对导游起到自我选择的甄别作用,还能起到诱导导游提高工作努力水平的激励作用。
[Abstract]:In the tourism service supply chain, the adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information between travel agency and tour guide will harm the benefit of travel agency. How to identify and motivate tour guides effectively is an important problem that travel agencies should pay attention to. Private information based on the ability and level of effort of tour guides is not observed by travel agencies, but its service performance can be observed as a basis, By using the theory and method of game theory and information economics, this paper designs the incentive mechanism under the continuous type of the guide's service ability, and obtains the optimal incentive mechanism parameters by using the optimization principle. The results show that travel agencies should design different incentive mechanisms for tour guides with different service capabilities. The incentive mechanism under the double asymmetric information can not only discriminate the tour guide's self-selection, but also induce the tour guide to improve the working level.
【作者单位】：湖南工业大学管理科学与工程研究所;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71201053) 湖南省社会科学基金资助项目(11YBA098) 湖南省教育厅科学研究资助项目(11C0394) 湖南工业大学社会科学研究资助项目(2011HSX06)
【分类号】：F224;F274

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