供应商研发决策研究

发布时间：2018-05-24 15:28

本文选题：供应商 + 自主研发决策　；参考：《重庆大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：供应商研发决策研究包括供应商自主研发决策与供应商被动参与研发决策两大类，本文在Bhaskaran和Krishnan研究结论的基础上通过：①供应商进行以降低成本为目的的研发；②供应商进行以提升产品质量为目的的研发；③供应商分担制造商研发成本三种形式来研究供应商研发决策问题。供应商分担制造商研发成本是供应商被动参与研发的常见方式之一，供应商应制造商的要求投入资源参与研发以达到降低成本和分担风险的目的，但随着产品技术的日益复杂以及供应商技术能力的不断提高，，供应商开始承担越来越多的研发任务，并在研发决策中面临更大的挑战。供应商不仅参与研发，而且在面向多制造商供货的现实场景中进行自主研发决策，其自主研发决策不仅受到自身资源约束，还受到外部环境，特别是制造商的约束。在资源一定的情况下，供应商在自主研发决策时面临选择共性技术还是专用性技术路线的两难选择，即：供应商针对面向所有制造商进行的提升产品质量或降低部件成本的共性技术研发决策；或供应商针对某一个特定制造商进行的提升产品质量或降低部件成本的专用性技术研发决策。本文以我国汽车行业为对象，以汽车零部件企业为案例，通过对重庆万里蓄电池企业三种场景下的研发决策进行分析，基于供应商研发的视角，分别构造了供应商进行以降低部件成本为目的的自主研发和供应商进行以提升最终产品质量为目的的自主研发两种情形，得出供应商在两种场景中选择共性技术和专用性技术情形下各自对应的最优研发决策。并针对供应商应制造商要求被动参与研发的场景，考虑多供应商不同分担意愿下，研究了供应商如何决策最优研发成本分担比例。重点研究了供应商在面临选择共性技术还是专用性技术路线的两难选择下如何进行自主研发决策。在供应商进行以降低部件成本为目的的研发中，针对面向多制造商的供应商自主研发决策问题，分别构造了供应商在选择共性技术和专用性技术研发决策情形下与两个制造商组成的三阶段非合作博弈模型，得到了供应商在这两种情形下各自的最优研发决策，通过对这两种不同技术路线中供应商最优研发程度比较，给出了这两种情形下供应商研发程度相等的条件和各自的占优区间。供应商选择不同技术路线，会在市场容量不变的情况下带来不同的部件成本降低幅度。进一步讨论了各参数变动对这两种情形下供应商最优研发决策的影响，并给出了相应的数值解，表明采用不同技术研发决策时供应商最优研发程度与制造商单位成本存在显著差异，即：采用共技术性研发决策时，与两个制造商单位成本负相关；采用专用性技术研发决策时，与面向专用性的制造商单位成本正相关，无专用性面向的制造商单位成本负相关。研究了在供应商进行以提升最终产品质量为目的的研发场景中，供应商选择共性技术和专用性技术下如何进行最优研发程度、最大化利润、参与约束的决策。供应商并非直接面向市场而是面向不同的制造商，供应商自主研发决策目标选择的不同导致了不同的技术路线，会带来不同的市场变化。通过建立两阶段非合作博弈模型得到供应商选择两种技术下各自的最大化利润、最优研发程度和参与约束条件，并对两种决策情形下供应商最大化利润进行比较，给出了这两种情形下供应商最大化利润相等的条件和各自的占优区间。最后运用算例对供应商在选择不同技术下影响其进行研发决策的各类参数进行敏感性分析，得出供应部件单位成本、供应部件价格、最终产品替代率、单位研发成本变动对这两种技术路线中供应商最优研发决策的影响。在考虑供应商不同分担意愿条件下，通过设计参与成本分担的供应商会获得供货比例增加的激励机制，研究了供应商在参与制造商研发成本分担中如何决策最优研发成本分担比例。针对在两家供应商与一家制造商组成的供应链体系中，并非所有的供应商会做出一致性的决策，考虑只有一家供应商参与研发成本分担的情形。制造商对参与分担的供应商实施增加供货比例的奖励机制，但保证未参与成本分担的供应商的供货量不少于分担前的供货量。通过逆向归纳法得到供应商最优研发成本分担比例和增加的供货比例区间，区间大小取决于参与成本分担的供应商与制造商的谈判能力，且参与分担研发成本的供应商在单位产品利润大于制造商单位产品利润的一定比例才有动机进行投资。最后运用算例对影响供应商最优研发成本分担比例的参数进行敏感性分析。
[Abstract]:The research on supplier R & D decision includes two categories: supplier's independent research and development decision and supplier's passive participation in R & D decision. On the basis of the research conclusions of Bhaskaran and Krishnan: (1) the supplier carries out R & D for the purpose of reducing the cost; 2. Take the manufacturer's R & D cost in three forms to study the supplier's R & D decision.
Supplier's sharing of R & D cost is one of the most common ways of supplier's passive participation in R & D. Suppliers should invest resources in R & D in order to reduce cost and share risk. However, with the increasing complexity of product technology and the increasing technical ability of suppliers, suppliers begin to take more and more responsibility. Many research and development tasks are faced with greater challenges in R & D decision. Suppliers are not only involved in R & D, but also make decisions on independent R & D in the realistic scenarios facing multiple manufacturers. Their independent R & D decisions are not only constrained by their own resources but also by the external environment, especially the constraints of the manufacturers. The company faces the dilemma of choosing common technology or special technical route in independent research and development decision, that is, the common technology research and development decision on the quality of the product or the cost of reducing the component for all manufacturers; or the quality of the product or the lower part of the supplier for a particular custom maker. A special technical research and development decision on cost.
This paper takes the automobile industry as the object, takes the auto parts enterprise as the case, analyzes the R & D Decision under the three scenarios of Chongqing Wanli battery enterprise, and constructs the self main R & D and supplier to improve the final product quality based on the supplier R & D perspective. Two cases of independent research and development are taken as the target, and the supplier selects the best R & D Decision under the situation of common technology and special technology in two scenarios. And considering the supplier's request for passive participation in R & D, and considering the different sharing intention of multi supplier, the author studies the optimal R & D of the supplier. Cost sharing ratio.
This paper focuses on how to make independent R & D decisions for suppliers in the face of the dilemma of choosing generic technology or special technology route.
In the research and development of the supplier in order to reduce the cost of components, the three stage non cooperative game model, which is composed of two manufacturers in the case of choosing common technology and special technology R & D decision, is constructed to solve the decision problem of independent research and development of suppliers oriented to multi manufacturer. The two kinds of situation of the supplier are obtained. By comparing the optimal R & D degree of the suppliers in these two different technical routes, the conditions for the equal research and development of the suppliers and their respective dominant intervals are given by the comparison of the supplier's optimal R & D degree in these two different technical routes. The influence of the variation of each parameter on the optimal R & D Decision of the supplier under these two situations is further discussed, and the corresponding numerical solutions are given. It shows that there is a significant difference between the optimal R & D degree of the supplier and the unit cost of the manufacturer when using different technologies for R & D decision. The negative correlation of bit cost; the use of special technology for R & D decision is positively related to the unit cost for the special-purpose manufacturer, and there is a negative correlation between the unit cost of no specific oriented manufacturer.
In a R & D scene with the aim of improving the quality of the final product, the supplier selects the best research and development degree, maximizes the profit and participates in the decision under the purpose of improving the quality of the final product. The supplier is not directly facing the market but is facing the different manufacturers, and the supplier's decision goal of independent research and development is selected. The choice of the difference leads to different technical routes and brings different market changes. Through the establishment of the two stage non cooperative game model, the maximum profit, the optimal R & D degree and the participation constraint conditions are obtained under the two technologies of supplier selection, and the comparison of the maximum profit for the two kinds of decision making cases is given, and the two kinds of these are given. Under the circumstances, the supplier maximizes the conditions of maximizing the profits and their respective dominant intervals. Finally, a numerical example is used to analyze the sensitivity analysis of the various parameters that affect the R & D Decision of the suppliers in different technologies. The unit cost, the supply component price, the final product replacement rate, and the change of the unit R & D cost are two. The influence of supplier's optimal R & D Decision in technical route.
Under the consideration of the different willingness to share the supplier and the incentive mechanism that the supply chamber of commerce is designed to participate in the cost sharing, the author studies how the supplier makes the optimal R & D cost sharing ratio in the R & D cost sharing of the manufacturer. Not all suppliers make a consistent decision, considering only one supplier participating in R & D cost sharing. The manufacturer implements an incentive mechanism to increase the supply ratio for the participating suppliers, but the supply of suppliers who are not involved in the cost sharing is not less than the amount of supply before the share. Through reverse induction The proportion of the supplier's optimal R & D cost sharing ratio and the increasing supply ratio range depend on the bargaining power of the suppliers and manufacturers participating in the cost sharing, and the suppliers who participate in the R & D cost are motivated to invest in a certain proportion of the profit of the unit product greater than the manufacturer's product. The sensitivity analysis of parameters affecting supplier's optimal R & D cost sharing ratio is carried out by an example.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F273.1

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