不同主导权下零售商双渠道供应链定价及协调研究

发布时间：2018-07-04 06:57

本文选题：主导权 + 零售商双渠道供应链　；参考：《南京邮电大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着互联网的迅猛发展,网络购物的便利性的增强,网络购物已成为人们不可或缺的购物方式。越来越多的制造商和传统零售商纷纷选择开辟网络渠道来寻求新的增长点,希望通过制造商双渠道战略和零售商双渠道战略减弱网络购物所带来冲击,拓展潜在的市场份额,增强企业竞争力。但是实施双渠道战略时,如果不同渠道销售同一产品,那么制造商双渠道之间、零售商双渠道之间必然存在互相争夺市场份额的情况,出现渠道冲突;尤其是供应链上的制造商和零售商均实施双渠道战略,将加剧渠道冲突,并导致双重边际效应,带来供应链垂直冲突问题。因此,本文在分析总结国内外制造商双渠道和零售商双渠道研究的基础上,以由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,运用Stackelberg博弈、数学建模及优化理论等对不同主导权下的零售商双渠道供应链和多渠道供应链的定价决策和契约协调机制进行研究。经过研究,本文得出的主要结论包括:(1)零售商主导和制造商主导的零售商双渠道供应链和多渠道供应链,在Stackelberg博弈下的分散决策均存在双重边际效应,供应链整体利润小于集中决策情境,供应链有进一步优化空间。(2)不同主导权下零售商双渠道供应链可通过收入共享契约和二部定价契约两种契约模型来实现供应链的协调,提高供应链的整体效率,并给出了制造商占主导地位时收入共享协调机制的适用条件以及零售商占主导地位时二部制定价协调机制的适用条件,通过调节两个契约模型的参数,都可实现制造商和零售商的双赢。(3)不同主导权下零售商双渠道和制造商双渠道并存的多渠道供应链,均可通过改进的收入共享契约模型来实现供应链的协调。但两种改进的收入共享契约参数设置需满足一定的要求,才可实现制造商利润和零售商利润的同时增加,且两种模型的可行性都已通过MATLAB数值算例分析得以验证。(4)不同主导权的影响从供应链成员角度来看,拥有主导权的成员,将做出最有益于自己的决策,最终也将获得更大的利润,因此制造商和零售商都应争取主导权来增大利益;从供应链整体角度来说,不同主导权对供应链总利润基本无影响。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the Internet and the increasing convenience of online shopping, online shopping has become an indispensable way of shopping. More and more manufacturers and traditional retailers have chosen to open up network channels to seek new growth points, hoping to reduce the impact of online shopping and expand potential market share through manufacturers' dual channel strategy and retailer's dual channel strategy. Enhance the competitiveness of enterprises. However, when implementing the dual channel strategy, if different channels sell the same product, then there must be competition for the market share between the manufacturer and the retailer between the two channels, and there will be channel conflict. In particular, both manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain implement the dual channel strategy, which will aggravate the channel conflict, lead to the double marginal effect, and bring about the vertical conflict of the supply chain. Therefore, on the basis of analyzing and summarizing the research of domestic and foreign manufacturers and retailers, this paper takes the double channel supply chain composed of single manufacturer and individual retailer as the research object, and applies Stackelberg game. Mathematical modeling and optimization theory are used to study the pricing decision and contract coordination mechanism of retailers' double-channel supply chain and multi-channel supply chain under different dominant power. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) there are double marginal effects in the decentralized decision in Stackelberg game for retailers' dual-channel supply chain and multi-channel supply chain under Stackelberg game. The overall profit of the supply chain is smaller than the centralized decision-making situation, and the supply chain has further optimization space. (2) under different dominant rights, the retailers' dual-channel supply chain can realize the coordination of the supply chain through two contract models of revenue sharing contract and two-part pricing contract. To improve the overall efficiency of the supply chain, the suitable conditions of the revenue sharing coordination mechanism when the manufacturer is dominant and the applicable condition of the two-part pricing coordination mechanism when the retailer is in the dominant position are given, and the parameters of the two contract models are adjusted by adjusting the parameters of the two contract models. (3) Multi-channel supply chain with two channels of retailers and two channels of manufacturer under different dominant rights can realize the coordination of supply chain through the improved revenue-sharing contract model. However, two kinds of improved revenue sharing contract parameters setting need to meet certain requirements, in order to achieve the manufacturer profit and retailer profit increase at the same time, And the feasibility of the two models has been verified by MATLAB numerical examples. (4) from the point of view of supply chain member, the member with the leading power will make the most beneficial decision. Therefore, both manufacturers and retailers should strive for dominance to increase profits; from the overall point of view of supply chain, different dominance has little effect on the total profit of supply chain.
【学位授予单位】：南京邮电大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

【参考文献】