非对称信息条件下两级供应链产品质量控制策略研究

发布时间：2018-07-22 13:29

【摘要】：基于博弈论和委托代理理论,研究了非对称信息条件下两级供应链如何制定产品质量控制策略问题。构建了制造商和销售商的期望收益函数模型,制造商存在单边道德风险问题(降低其产品质量水平),此时销售商将支付"信息租金"以减少道德风险。运用最优化原理,求解了制造商的最优价格折扣、产品质量预防水平与销售商的最优外部损失成本分摊比例、质量检验水平,并进行了算例分析,结果表明:随着制造商产品质量预防水平的提高,制造商的质量预防成本将显著减少;随着销售商产品质量检验水平的增加,制造商所分摊的外部损失成本将减少,外部损失成本的分摊比例呈下降趋势,制造商产品质量缺陷概率将降低,制造商的期望收益也将增加,而销售商为激励制造商提高产品质量水平,将支付"信息租金"的成本,其期望收益将减少,此时整个供应链的联合期望收益呈"倒U"型,求解了期望收益的最大值,证明所提出的产品质量控制策略是有效的。
[Abstract]:Based on game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper studies how to formulate product quality control strategy for two-level supply chain under asymmetric information. The expected income function model of manufacturer and seller is constructed. The manufacturer has unilateral moral hazard problem (reducing the quality level of his product), in which the seller will pay "information rent" to reduce moral hazard. By using the optimization principle, the optimal price discount of manufacturer, the level of product quality prevention and the optimal cost allocation ratio of external loss of the seller, the quality inspection level are solved, and an example is given. The results show that with the improvement of manufacturer's quality prevention level, the manufacturer's cost of quality prevention will be significantly reduced, and with the increase of vendor's product quality inspection level, the manufacturer's share of the cost of external loss will be reduced. The proportion of cost of external loss is decreasing, the probability of quality defect of manufacturer will be reduced, the expected income of manufacturer will also increase, and the seller will pay the cost of "information rent" in order to encourage manufacturer to improve the level of product quality. The expected income will be reduced, and the joint expected return of the whole supply chain is "inverted U" type. The maximum value of the expected return is solved, which proves that the proposed product quality control strategy is effective.
【作者单位】：山东师范大学商学院;中央财经大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究项目“竞争生产商分销渠道质量控制策略契约设计研究”(编号:12YJC630327);教育部人文社会科学研究项目“区域质量影响因素分析及管理对策研究”(编号:10YJA630194) 山东省自然科学基金项目“非对称信息条件下三级供应链产品质量控制契约设计研究”(编号:ZR2012GQ001)
【分类号】：F224;F274;F713

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