规模不经济下双渠道供应链的定价及信息共享价值研究
发布时间:2018-07-29 11:43
【摘要】:近年来,愈来愈多的企业通过网络购物平台,直接将产品卖给终端的购物者,这就是电子商务直销渠道销售产品模式。但同时,这些企业并没有选择关闭传统零售渠道,两种销售渠道并存的状态形成了一种新型的供应链模式,即双渠道供应链销售模式。由于直销渠道的加入,使得供应链系统更加复杂,供应链各成员之间的信息不对称现象严重。一方面,在渠道分化情形下,信息分享程度对供应链的影响值得深入探讨。另一方面,在现实中作为双渠道供应链的主导者,制造商的边际生产成本可能会随产量的增加而加大,出现生产规模不经济的情况。本文基于双渠道供应链和信息不对称下的博弈理论,将制造商规模不经济引入到双渠道供应链的信息共享问题中。考虑了一个开设直销渠道且生产规模不经济的制造商和一个零售商组成的简单二级供应链,制造商和零售商各自拥有部分市场预测信息。分析了考虑制造商规模不经济下,信息共享与不共享时渠道成员的定价策略、最大期望收益及信息共享价值,并研究了制造商规模不经济程度对成员定价策略、最大期望收益以及信息共享价值的影响。研究结果表明,无论信息是否共享,在最优定价策略中,批发价格,零售渠道的零售价格,直销渠道的直销价格都将随着规模不经济程度的增加而增大,且信息共享总能使制造商获益。但随着规模不经济程度的增加,制造商获取零售商私有信息的意愿愈来愈强。分析发现满足某些特定条件时,信息共享才会有利于零售商,并且随着规模不经济程度的增加,零售商进行信息分享的意愿会越弱。最后,运用了Mathematica进行数值分析,研究了规模不经济对渠道成员定价策略、最优期望利润以及信息共享价值的影响,验证了本文所得结论的有效性,给出了一些管理视角的解释。
[Abstract]:In recent years, more and more enterprises sell products directly to the shoppers through the network shopping platform. This is the model of selling products in the direct marketing channel of e-commerce. At the same time, these enterprises have not chosen to close the traditional retail channels. The coexistence of the two channels of sales has formed a new supply chain model, that is, the dual channel supply. The supply chain system is more complex and the information asymmetry between the members of the supply chain is serious because of the direct marketing channel. On the one hand, the influence of information sharing on the supply chain is worth exploring. On the other hand, as the leader of the supply chain in the dual channel, manufacturing is the leader of the supply chain in the reality. The marginal production cost of the business may increase with the increase of production, and the production scale is uneconomical. Based on the game theory under the dual channel supply chain and information asymmetry, this paper introduces the manufacturer scale uneconomy into the information sharing problem of the dual channel supply chain. A simple two level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer with a manufacturer and a retailer each has part of the market forecast information. The pricing strategy, maximum expected income and information sharing value of the channel members are analyzed considering the manufacturer's scale uneconomical, information sharing and non sharing, and the uneconomic process of the manufacturer's scale is studied. The results show that, whether the information is shared or not, the wholesale price, the retail price of the retail channel, the direct selling price of the direct channel will increase with the increase of the scale of the uneconomy in the optimal pricing strategy, and the information sharing can always make the manufacturer. But with the increase in scale of scale, the willingness of manufacturers to obtain private information from retailers is becoming stronger. The analysis finds that information sharing will be beneficial to retailers when certain specific conditions are met, and with the increase of the scale of scale, the less willing of the retailers to share information. Finally, the use of Mathematica The effect of scale uneconomy on the pricing strategy of channel members, the optimal expected profit and the value of information sharing is studied. The validity of the conclusions in this paper is verified and some management perspectives are explained.
【学位授予单位】:天津大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F274
本文编号:2152573
[Abstract]:In recent years, more and more enterprises sell products directly to the shoppers through the network shopping platform. This is the model of selling products in the direct marketing channel of e-commerce. At the same time, these enterprises have not chosen to close the traditional retail channels. The coexistence of the two channels of sales has formed a new supply chain model, that is, the dual channel supply. The supply chain system is more complex and the information asymmetry between the members of the supply chain is serious because of the direct marketing channel. On the one hand, the influence of information sharing on the supply chain is worth exploring. On the other hand, as the leader of the supply chain in the dual channel, manufacturing is the leader of the supply chain in the reality. The marginal production cost of the business may increase with the increase of production, and the production scale is uneconomical. Based on the game theory under the dual channel supply chain and information asymmetry, this paper introduces the manufacturer scale uneconomy into the information sharing problem of the dual channel supply chain. A simple two level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer with a manufacturer and a retailer each has part of the market forecast information. The pricing strategy, maximum expected income and information sharing value of the channel members are analyzed considering the manufacturer's scale uneconomical, information sharing and non sharing, and the uneconomic process of the manufacturer's scale is studied. The results show that, whether the information is shared or not, the wholesale price, the retail price of the retail channel, the direct selling price of the direct channel will increase with the increase of the scale of the uneconomy in the optimal pricing strategy, and the information sharing can always make the manufacturer. But with the increase in scale of scale, the willingness of manufacturers to obtain private information from retailers is becoming stronger. The analysis finds that information sharing will be beneficial to retailers when certain specific conditions are met, and with the increase of the scale of scale, the less willing of the retailers to share information. Finally, the use of Mathematica The effect of scale uneconomy on the pricing strategy of channel members, the optimal expected profit and the value of information sharing is studied. The validity of the conclusions in this paper is verified and some management perspectives are explained.
【学位授予单位】:天津大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F274
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