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在系统拍卖机制下考虑参与者风险态度的供应链协调研究

发布时间:2018-08-06 17:49
【摘要】:供应链协调已经成为供应链管理的核心和热点问题,建立科学合理的协调机制有助于协调供应链中各参与者的行动,促进其建立战略性合作伙伴关系,共担风险共享收益,从而实现整个供应链利润最大化,提高整个系统的竞争力。拍卖为竞争市场上的投标商和采购方提供了一种简单又稳健的协调机制。拍卖机制在采购市场上得到了有效应用,增加了参与者的积极性,促进了供应链协调。本文考虑竞争环境下由两个供应商向一个零售商提供同质的产品或服务的供应链系统。同时,考虑了零售商的风险态度,并用VaR模型衡量了风险与收益之间的关系。因此,本文在考虑参与者风险态度的情况下,对信息对称和信息不对称两种情形下,基于随机指数型需求函数,通过建立非拍卖的基础模型、目录拍卖模型和二部合同拍卖模型研究分析了该供应链系统的协调问题。在信息对称情形下和信息不对称情形下,均有以下结论:在集中决策时,零售商获得整个供应链100%的利润,尽管此时供应链系统的总利润最高,但供应商没有利润可得,因此供应商没有参与集中决策的动力;当分散决策时,零售商和供应商均能获得利润,但整个供应链利润低于集中决策下供应链总利润,因此相对于集中决策,分散决策存在效率损失。在目录拍卖机制下,供应链的总利润比分散决策情形下的供应链总利润有所提高,但仍有效率损失;在二部合同拍卖机制下,在一定条件下,整个供应链的利润达到集中决策时的最大化利润,并且实现了零售商和供应商之间的收益共享以及供应链协调。
[Abstract]:Supply chain coordination has become the core and hot issue of supply chain management. The establishment of scientific and reasonable coordination mechanism will help to coordinate the actions of all participants in the supply chain, promote their strategic partnership, share risks and share benefits. In order to maximize the profit of the whole supply chain, improve the competitiveness of the whole system. Auctions provide a simple and robust coordination mechanism for bidders and purchasers in competitive markets. The auction mechanism has been applied effectively in the purchasing market, which increases the enthusiasm of the participants and promotes the coordination of the supply chain. This paper considers a supply chain system in which two suppliers provide a retailer with a homogeneous product or service in a competitive environment. At the same time, the risk attitude of retailers is considered, and the relationship between risk and profit is measured by VaR model. Therefore, under the consideration of participants' risk attitude and information symmetry and information asymmetry, based on the stochastic exponential demand function, this paper establishes the basic model of non-auction. The inventory auction model and two contract auction models are used to analyze the coordination of the supply chain system. In the case of information symmetry and information asymmetry, the following conclusions can be drawn: in centralized decision-making, the retailer obtains 100% of the profit of the whole supply chain, although the total profit of the supply chain system is the highest at this time, the supplier has no profit to get. Therefore, the supplier has no incentive to participate in the centralized decision; when the decision is decentralized, both the retailer and the supplier can gain profits, but the profit of the whole supply chain is lower than the total profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision, so it is relative to the centralized decision. There is a loss of efficiency in decentralized decision making. Under the catalogue auction mechanism, the total profit of the supply chain is higher than that of the decentralized decision, but the total profit is still lost efficiently; under the two contract auction mechanism, under certain conditions, the total profit of the supply chain is higher than that of the decentralized decision. The profit of the whole supply chain reaches the maximum profit of centralized decision, and realizes the profit sharing and supply chain coordination between retailers and suppliers.
【学位授予单位】:青岛大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274

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