基于利他偏好的闭环供应链定价策略

发布时间：2018-09-11 17:19

【摘要】：本文将利他偏好引入闭环供应链的定价策略模型,对制造商回收和零售商回收条件下的由一个零售商和一个制造商组成的闭环供应链进行研究。首先,研究了未引入利他偏好的闭环供应链定价和引入了利他偏好的闭环供应链定价策略,然后比较两种情况下制造商回收和零售商回收时的定价策略。通过数学模型推导和数值分析,得到结论:在零售商进行回收时,制造商利他属性的增强,既有利于零售商收益的增加,又有利于供应链收益的增加;零售商利他属性的增强虽然对供应链收益的增加有利但对制造商是不利的。零售商效用和供应链效用是零售商利他偏好的增函数,制造商效用是零售商利他偏好的减函数。在制造商进行回收时,制造商利他属性的增强,既有利于零售商收益的增加,又有利于供应链收益的增加;零售商利他属性的增强,有利于制造商收益的增加,但对整个供应链收益的提高是不利的。制造商效用和供应链效用是零售商利他偏好的增函数,零售商效用是零售商利他偏好的减函数。这表明零售商利他水平越高对自身造成的损失越严重,以至于即使提高制造商收益也无法弥补自身利益损失对供应链收益造成的损害。因此零售商作为营利性组织,当自己的利益低于期望时,会适当降低自己的利他程度,因此零售商无法达到完全利他水平。无论是制造商回收模式还是零售商回收模式,利他偏好的存在能够促进供应链上下游决策者的合作,提高供应链整体的利润和效用,实现闭环供应链整体利润的协调,使其高于不考虑利他偏好时的利润。在制造商回收时,制造商和零售商总是维持在较低的利他行为倾向,以保证自身利润的最大化。在零售商回收时,制造商会降低自身的利他偏好甚至不考虑利他行为,而且更愿意选择与具有低利他行为倾向的零售商合作。
[Abstract]:In this paper altruistic preference is introduced into the pricing strategy model of closed-loop supply chain and the closed-loop supply chain which consists of one retailer and one manufacturer under the condition of manufacturer recovery and retailer recovery is studied. Firstly, the closed-loop supply chain pricing without altruistic preference and the closed-loop supply chain pricing strategy with altruistic preference are studied. Through mathematical model derivation and numerical analysis, it is concluded that the enhancement of manufacturer's altruistic property is not only conducive to the increase of retailer's income, but also to the increase of supply chain's income. The increase in retailer altruism is beneficial to the increase in supply chain revenue but not to manufacturers. Retailer utility and supply chain utility are the increasing function of retailer altruistic preference and manufacturer utility is the decreasing function of retailer altruistic preference. The enhancement of manufacturer's altruistic property is not only conducive to the increase of retailer's income, but also to the increase of supply chain's income, and the enhancement of retailer's altruistic attribute is beneficial to the increase of manufacturer's income. But to the whole supply chain income enhancement is disadvantageous. Manufacturer utility and supply chain utility are the increasing function of retailer altruistic preference and retailer utility is the decreasing function of retailer altruistic preference. This indicates that the higher the retailer's altruistic level, the more serious the loss to itself, so that even increasing the manufacturer's income cannot compensate for the damage caused by the loss of self-interest to the supply chain's income. Therefore, as a for-profit organization, retailers can reduce their altruism properly when their interests are lower than expected, so retailers can not reach the level of complete altruism. The existence of altruistic preference can promote the cooperation of upstream and downstream decision makers in the supply chain, improve the overall profit and utility of the supply chain, and realize the coordination of the overall profit of the closed-loop supply chain. Make it higher than the profit if altruistic preference is not taken into account. When the manufacturer reclaims, the manufacturer and the retailer always maintain the low altruistic behavior tendency, in order to guarantee their own profit maximization. When retailers recycle, manufacturers reduce their altruistic preferences or even ignore altruism, and prefer to cooperate with retailers with low altruistic tendencies.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

【参考文献】