基于博弈论的制造商回收再制造闭环供应链模型研究

发布时间：2018-09-13 11:33

【摘要】：在由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的制造商回收再制造闭环供应链中,考虑系统成员间存在Nash均衡博弈、制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈和零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈等权利关系,研究并比较三种分散式决策闭环供应链的定价决策及利润问题。研究结论表明:在制造商领导的市场中,零售商的零售价与获得产品的批发价呈正相关关系;在零售商领导的市场中,制造商的批发价和回收率均与零售商的零售价呈负相关关系;回收产品的潜在期望收益是回收行为的驱动因素;在分散式决策闭环供应链中,市场无领导者时,消费者获得的收益最多,闭环供应链也越有利于降低资源消耗,且制造商和零售商均有动机成为领导者,其拥有的权利越大,议价能力会越强,获得的利润就会越多;与分散式决策相比,集中式决策闭环供应链的零售价最低,回收率和渠道总利润最高。最后,我们设计了可协调三种分散式决策闭环供应链的收益共享契约。
[Abstract]:In the closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, the Nash equilibrium game, the Stackelberg game led by the manufacturer and the Stackelberg game led by the retailer are considered. The pricing decision and profit problem of three decentralized closed-loop supply chains are studied and compared. The results show that the retail price of the retailer is positively correlated with the wholesale price of the product in the market led by the manufacturer, while in the market led by the retailer, the retail price is positively correlated with the wholesale price of the product. Both the wholesale price and the recovery rate of the manufacturer are negatively correlated with the retail price of the retailer; the potential expected income of the recovered product is the driving factor of the recovery behavior; when there is no leader in the market in the decentralized decision closed loop supply chain, Consumers get the most income, the closed-loop supply chain is also conducive to reduce resource consumption, and manufacturers and retailers have the motivation to become leaders, the greater their rights, bargaining power will be stronger, the more profits will be obtained; Compared with decentralized decision making, centralized decision closed loop supply chain has the lowest retail price, the highest recovery rate and the highest total channel profit. Finally, we design a revenue sharing contract that can coordinate three decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chains.
【作者单位】：大连理工大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：国家重点基金项目(61034003) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271041)
【分类号】：F224.32;F274

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