信息不对称下多渠道闭环供应链的决策模型研究

发布时间：2019-01-04 08:25

【摘要】：时代在发展,科技在进步,电子产品已经成为生活中必不可少的一部分,它们的出现为生活带来了很多便利。人们对产品性能需求的多样化,加快了电子产品的研发速度,同时也带来了大量废弃电子产品。大量的“电子垃圾”,会给人类赖以生存的环境造成污染,若进行回收再利用,就可减少污染,并能高效的利用这些资源。制造企业在生产制造产品的同时,若对废弃电子产品积极回收并加以利用,不但能够降低制造成本,还能为企业进行品牌宣传,提高知名度。因此,本文将废弃电子产品引入到闭环供应链中并进行相关的研究具有重要的意义。本文基于私人信息维度的差异,对拥有多销售或多回收渠道的闭环供应链决策模型进行研究,构建了三种模型:制造商与零售商共同销售,并委托回收商进行回收;制造商与回收商共同回收,并委托零售商进行销售;制造商与零售商、回收商三者共同回收,并委托零售商进行销售。回收商或零售商接受委托,作为代理人,拥有私人信息,包括回收(销售)能力信息和回收(销售)努力程度信息。委托人制造商作为信息劣势方,根据委托代理理论和机制设计理论等方式,设计契约促使代理方如实汇报自己的能力信息,并激励其付出最大的努力程度。本文针对每个模型,分别考虑了代理人的努力程度信息单一不对称和代理人的能力信息和努力程度信息双重不对称两种情形。根据不同的情形建立相应的模型,求解分析并进行仿真,对不同的结果和参数进行分析。通过比较和分析决策结果后总结出以下结论:随着信息不对称维度的增加,委托人制造商获得的期望利润降低,具备高能力的代理商能够付出的努力水平不变,获得的单位报酬不变,期望利润增加,而能力为低类型的代理商付出的努力程度降低,得到的单位报酬降低,得到的期望利润不变;随着闭环供应链中回收渠道的增多,回收总量增大,回收商可得到的期望利润降低,制造商可得到的期望利润增加;随着大众环保意识的增强,回收数量增多,制造商获得的期望利润增大;随着市场中高能力代理商的增多,高能力者获得的利润呈现递减的趋势,低能力者获得的利润为保留收益,制造商获得的利润增加。因此,委托人制造商设计契约甄别代理商的信息能够增加委托人的收益,渠道的增多同样能提高制造商的利润,两种方式在不同的角度提高了闭环供应链的利润。
[Abstract]:With the development of the times and the progress of science and technology, electronic products have become an indispensable part of life, and their appearance has brought a lot of convenience to life. The diversification of demand for product performance speeds up the research and development of electronic products, but also brings a large number of abandoned electronic products. A large amount of "electronic waste" will cause pollution to the environment on which human beings rely for survival. If recycling is carried out, pollution can be reduced and these resources can be used efficiently. When manufacturing enterprises produce and manufacture products, if waste electronic products are recovered and utilized actively, it can not only reduce the cost of manufacturing, but also promote the brand and raise the visibility for the enterprises. Therefore, it is of great significance to introduce abandoned electronic products into closed-loop supply chain. Based on the difference of private information dimension, this paper studies the closed-loop supply chain decision model with multiple sales or multiple recovery channels, and constructs three models: manufacturer and retailer sell together and entrust recycler to recycle; Manufacturers and recyclers reclaim together and entrust retailers to sell; manufacturers, retailers and recyclers reclaim together and entrust retailers to sell. A recycler or retailer is entrusted to act as an agent and has private information, including recovery (sales) capability information and recovery (sales) effort information. The principal manufacturer, as the information inferior party, according to the principal-agent theory and the mechanism design theory, designs the contract to urge the agent to report his ability information truthfully, and to encourage him to pay the best effort. In this paper, for each model, we consider the single asymmetry of agent's effort degree information and the double asymmetry of agent's ability information and effort degree information. According to different cases, the corresponding model is established, the solution is analyzed and simulated, and the different results and parameters are analyzed. After comparing and analyzing the decision results, the following conclusions are concluded: with the increase of information asymmetry dimension, the expected profit of the principal manufacturer decreases, and the level of effort that the agent with high capability can pay remains unchanged. The unit reward obtained is constant, the expected profit increases, while the ability to pay for the low type of agent is reduced, the unit reward is reduced, and the expected profit is not changed; With the increase of recovery channels in closed-loop supply chain, the total amount of recovery increases, the expected profit of recycler decreases, and the expected profit of manufacturer increases. As the public awareness of environmental protection increases, the amount of recycling increases, and the expected profits of manufacturers increase; With the increase of the high capacity agents in the market, the profit of the high ability person is decreasing, the profit of the low ability person is the reserved profit, and the profit of the manufacturer is increasing. Therefore, the information of client manufacturer designing contract screening agent can increase the profit of client, the increase of channels can also increase the profit of manufacturer, and the profit of closed-loop supply chain can be improved by two different ways.
【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

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