高管持股对企业绩效影响的研究

发布时间：2018-02-11 05:23

  本文关键词： 高管持股 员工持股计划 核心员工 企业绩效　出处：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：委托代理问题一直都是公司治理研究的热点问题,理论研究者和实际工作者一直在努力探索有效的高管激励方式,以缓解委托代理问题,以期实现企业绩效的最大化。员工股权激励计划自在美国最先实施以来,效果良好,一直被当作研究高管股权激励的切入点,备受学者们的关注。本文突破了前人将员工股权激励等同于高管股权激励的研究方式,对员工股权激励计划的对象一高管人员和核心员工分别加以研究。本文首先总结了研究中所涉及的相关理论和研究成果,经过深入的理论分析,本文认为高管持股比例与企业绩效正相关,而员工持股计划和股权集中度作为调节变量,对两者具有正向的调节作用。为了深入探讨四者之间的关系,本文提出了四个假设,构建了八个模型,通过实证的方法,分别对四个假设进行了一一验证和分析。本文以2010-2015年我国沪深两市A股市场的上市公司为例,剔除了不符合研究条件的公司,最终获得222个样本,通过实证检验,主要得出了以下三大结论:(1)高管持股比例与企业绩效正相关;(2)员工持股计划中,对核心员工的激励范围正向调节高管团队持股比例和企业绩效之间的关系;(3)员工持股计划中,对核心员工的激励规模正向调节高管团队持股比例和企业绩效之间的关系。希望可以通过本文的研究,给企业内外部的利益相关者以启发,不断完善和推动我国股权激励计划的顺利施行
[Abstract]:The principal-agent problem has always been a hot issue in the research of corporate governance. Theoretical researchers and practical workers have been trying to explore an effective way to encourage senior executives to alleviate the principal-agent problem. In order to maximize the performance of the enterprise. Since the first implementation of the employee equity incentive plan in the United States, the results have been good, has been used as the entry point for the study of executive equity incentive. This paper breaks through the previous research methods that equate employee equity incentive with executive equity incentive. The object of employee equity incentive plan, senior management and core staff, are studied separately. Firstly, this paper summarizes the relevant theories and research results involved in the research, after in-depth theoretical analysis, This paper holds that the proportion of executive ownership is positively related to enterprise performance, while the employee stock ownership plan and ownership concentration, as regulating variables, play a positive role in regulating the two. In order to explore the relationship between the four, this paper puts forward four hypotheses. Eight models are constructed, and the four hypotheses are tested and analyzed respectively by empirical methods. This paper takes the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2010 to 2015 as an example to eliminate the companies that do not meet the requirements of the research. Finally, 222 samples were obtained. By empirical test, the following three conclusions were drawn: 1) the proportion of executive stock ownership is positively related to corporate performance. The incentive range for the core staff is positively adjusted to adjust the relationship between the proportion of senior management team shareholding and the performance of the enterprise. (3) in the ESOP, The incentive scale of the core staff positively adjusts the relationship between the proportion of the top management team holding shares and the enterprise performance. It is hoped that through the research of this paper, it can enlighten the internal and external stakeholders of the enterprise. Continuously perfecting and promoting the smooth implementation of China's Equity incentive Plan
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.91;F272.5;F832.51
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本文编号：1502299