国企混合所有制改革高管显性激励与隐性激励协同效应研究

发布时间：2018-02-17 08:58

本文关键词： 混合所有制改革货币薪酬股权激励在职消费协同效应　出处：《重庆理工大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：混合所有制改革是新时期国企改革的方向和突破口,其中高管激励问题是改革和完善公司治理机制的重要方面。混合所有制企业与单一制企业相比,在高管显性激励与隐性激励的效果上会存在差异,如何对混合所有制改革后的企业高管进行有效激励具有一定的研究价值。本文基于国有企业进行混合所有制改革的大背景,研究混合所有制企业内部高管激励问题,为国企混合所有制改革提供相关借鉴参考。本文综合利用文献分析、理论演绎与实证分析的方法,对混合所有制企业高管激励的两类主要机制——显性激励(货币薪酬激励和股权激励)和隐性激励(主要是在职消费)分别与公司绩效的关系及两者结合所发挥的协同效应进行了探讨研究。首先,总结评述了之前学者关于国有企业混合所有制改革、高管显性激励经济后果、高管隐性激励经济后果以及显性激励与隐性激励关系方面的研究。其次,根据委托代理理论、激励理论、契约理论和管理层权力理论就高管货币薪酬、持股比例、在职消费对公司绩效的影响以及前两者与后者的协同效应关系进行了理论分析,并提出了相应假设及研究模型。再次,以2013-2015年连续三年在中国A股市场中已经建立混合所有制形式的469家上市公司为研究样本,通过描述性统计分析、相关性分析及多元回归分析对假设进行了实证检验。为确保研究结果的可靠性,本文还对实证模型做了稳健性检验。本文的研究结果显示:混合所有制上市公司高管显性激励对公司绩效有显著提升作用,不论是对高管进行的货币薪酬激励还是股权激励都发挥了积极效果;混合所有制上市公司的高管隐性激励——在职消费与公司绩效呈现出倒U型关系,即随着在职消费的增加公司绩效先提高后下降,证明了高管在职消费既存在合理性,同时其超额部分也存在负面性;混合所有制上市公司的高管显性激励与隐性激励之间并不是完全的协同效应,其中货币薪酬激励和在职消费激励具有显著的协同效应,而股权激励与在职消费激励的协同效应不显著,但发现了高管股权激励对超额在职消费的抑制效果。最后,本文在总结研究结论的基础上,提出了在国有企业进行混合所有制改革中如何对高管进行有效激励的政策建议,并总结了本文研究中的不足,探讨了未来该领域的研究方向。
[Abstract]:The reform of mixed ownership is the direction and breakthrough of the reform of state-owned enterprises in the new period, in which the issue of executive incentive is an important aspect of reforming and perfecting the corporate governance mechanism. There will be differences in the effect of explicit incentive and implicit incentive. How to effectively motivate the executives after the mixed ownership reform has some research value. This paper is based on the background of the state-owned enterprises to carry out the mixed ownership reform. In order to provide reference for the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises, this paper makes comprehensive use of literature analysis, theoretical deduction and empirical analysis methods. The relationship between explicit incentive (monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive) and implicit incentive (mainly on the job consumption) and corporate performance, and the combination of them, are two main mechanisms of executive incentive in mixed ownership enterprises: explicit incentive (monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive) and implicit incentive (mainly on the job consumption). The synergistic effect is studied. First of all, This paper summarizes and reviews the previous researches on the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, the economic consequences of executive explicit incentive, the economic consequences of executive implicit incentive and the relationship between explicit incentive and implicit incentive. Secondly, according to the principal-agent theory, Incentive theory, contract theory and management power theory analyze the influence of monetary compensation, shareholding ratio, in-service consumption on corporate performance and the relationship between the former two and the latter. The corresponding hypothesis and research model are put forward. Thirdly, taking 469 listed companies which have established the mixed ownership form in China's A-share market for three consecutive years from 2013-2015 as the research sample, the descriptive statistical analysis is carried out. Correlation analysis and multivariate regression analysis are used to test the hypothesis. The results show that the dominant incentive of executives in mixed ownership companies has a significant effect on corporate performance. Both monetary and equity incentives for executives have played a positive role; the implicit incentive of executives in mixed ownership listed companies-the relationship between in-service consumption and corporate performance is inversely U-shaped. That is, with the increase of in-service consumption, the corporate performance first increases and then drops, which proves that the in-service consumption of senior executives is not only reasonable, but also negative in the excess part. There is not a complete synergistic effect between overt incentive and implicit incentive in mixed ownership listed companies, in which monetary compensation incentive and in-service consumption incentive have significant synergistic effect. However, the synergistic effect of equity incentive and on-the-job consumption incentive is not significant, but the inhibition effect of executive equity incentive on excess on-the-job consumption is found. This paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to effectively motivate senior executives in the reform of mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises, summarizes the shortcomings of this study, and probes into the research direction in this field in the future.
【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.1;F272.92

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