“统合治理”模式下的高廉政风险及其制约监督研究

发布时间：2018-04-17 16:27

本文选题：地方政府 + 统合治理　；参考：《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2017年02期

【摘要】："统合治理"是指地方政府在城市化过程中利用公司化平台进行经营性运作的治理模式,其典型的组织化治理工具是"管委会—公司"架构的政府项目平台。"统合治理"模式具有较高的治理绩效,但随之而来的是公权力"遁入私法"现象,从而导致廉政风险不断增加。公权力"遁入私法"在一定程度上绕过了一统体制下自上而下的制度约束,激发了地方政府发展经济的自主性,并使其经济权力得以扩张;但同时由于制约与监督制度未能有效构建,导致权力失控危险增加,集中体现在公权力可以在政府与企业的双重身份中切换,使公权力能够借由"遁入私法"的方式摆脱传统的控权制度。"统合治理"模式能否避免高廉政风险并继续保持较高的治理绩效,在很大程度上取决于对现有制约监督机制的重构。
[Abstract]:"Integrative governance" refers to the governance mode in which local governments make use of corporatization platform in the process of urbanization. The typical organizational governance tool is the government project platform with the structure of "management committee and company". "The mode of integrated governance has higher governance performance, but the phenomenon of "escaping into private law" of public power leads to the increasing risk of clean government.To some extent, the public power "evading into private law" bypasses the system constraints from the top to the bottom under the monolithic system, excites the autonomy of the local government to develop the economy, and makes its economic power expand.But at the same time, because the restriction and supervision system can not be constructed effectively, the risk of losing control of power increases, which is reflected in the fact that the public power can be switched between the government and the enterprise.To enable public power to escape from the traditional system of control by "escaping into private law". "Whether the integrated governance mode can avoid the high risk of clean government and maintain higher governance performance depends to a great extent on the reconstruction of the existing restriction and supervision mechanism.
【作者单位】：浙江大学城市学院城市治理与立法研究中心;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA016) 杭州市哲学社会科学基金(G16JC012)
【分类号】：D262.6

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