D2D通信的协作激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-27 18:55

本文选题：D2D通信 + D2D内容共享　；参考：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着智能移动终端的普及和流行,移动数据流量正以前所未有的速率急剧增加。蜂窝网络被迫从过去以连接为主的端到端通信向以内容为中心的未来通信转变,面临着资源短缺,容量受限等诸多压力和挑战。因此,急需新的通信模式出现来解决移动用户对流量和频谱的巨大需求。D2D通信(Device-to-Device Communications,D2D)作为 5G(5th Generation Mobile Communication)的关键技术之一,被广泛认为是可以解决未来移动通信的频谱资源缺乏问题,卸载基站流量的重要手段之一,极具发展情景。D2D通信的优势源于其可以绕过蜂窝基础架构实现两个距离相近的移动用户的直接通信和内容共享。未来网络中经常出现的场景可能是,基站将流行的请求内容发送至某移动用户,该移动用户再通过D2D通信分享给附近需求的其他用户。然而现有的D2D通信研究忽视了一个重要的问题,即怎样去激励用户参与到D2D通信中,去分享这些内容给有需求的用户。如果移动用户不愿意通过D2D通信分享内容,那么基站仍然需使用蜂窝下行链路提供内容,D2D的这些优势也就无从谈起。本文致力于设计协作激励机制激励移动用户使用D2D通信分享内容,以缓解蜂窝网的资源和流量压力。本文引入了信息经济学中的委托代理理论来构建和规划D2D通信中的协作激励设计。在D2D内容共享场景中,基站(Base Station,BS)作为委托人,内容提供者扮演代理人通过D2D通信方式发送内容给请求者。本文研究了 BS和内容提供者之间的两种信息不对称情况,分别利用信号发送模型和绩效模型设计了两套协作激励机制,SCSI(Signaling-based Content Sharing Scheme)机制和 PRCSI(Performance-Related Content Sharing Incentive)机制,去激励内容提供者参与到D2D内容共享中来。在SCSI机制中,通过推导每个内容提供者的最优策略来最大化内容提供者的效用收益,并保证基站的效益不为负值。在PRCSI中,代理人与委托人签订绩效合同来促使代理人更加努力的工作,并解决隐藏行动带来的道德风险问题。在SCSI和PRCSI两个协作激励机制中,代理人和委托人都选取了最优行动来到达纳什均衡状态。仿真结果显示,SCSI和PRCSI可以提高接收速率,增大代理人和委托人的效用,使内容提供者得到激励。如此,系统的频谱效率和通信速率得到了极大的提升。且代理人的行动符合一个理性的市场人的选择。
[Abstract]:With the popularity and popularity of intelligent mobile terminals, mobile data traffic is increasing rapidly at an unprecedented rate. Cellular network is forced to change from end-to-end communication to content-centric future communication, facing many pressures and challenges, such as shortage of resources, limited capacity and so on. Therefore, the emergence of new communication modes is urgently needed to solve the huge demand of mobile users for traffic and spectrum. As one of the key technologies of 5G(5th Generation Mobile Communication), D2D communication device / to-device communications / D2D) is widely considered to be able to solve the problem of lack of spectrum resources in future mobile communications. One of the most important ways to unload base station traffic is that the advantage of developing scenario. D2D communication is that it can bypass the cellular infrastructure to realize direct communication and content sharing between two mobile users with close distance. A common scenario in future networks may be that the base station sends popular request content to a mobile user, who in turn shares it with other nearby users via D2D communication. However, the existing research on D2D communication neglects an important problem, that is, how to encourage users to participate in D2D communication and share the content to users who need it. If mobile users are unwilling to share content over D2D communications, these advantages of using cellular downlinks to provide content for base stations will not be possible. This paper is devoted to designing collaborative incentive mechanism to encourage mobile users to share content using D2D communication, so as to alleviate the pressure of resources and traffic in cellular networks. This paper introduces the principal-agent theory in information economics to construct and plan collaborative incentive design in D2D communication. In the D2D content sharing scenario, the base station base station (BSs) acts as the principal, and the content provider acts as the agent to send the content to the requester through D2D communication. In this paper, two kinds of information asymmetry between BS and content provider are studied, and two sets of cooperative incentive mechanisms, SCSI signaling-based Content Sharing Scheme) and PRCSI(Performance-Related Content Sharing Incentive), are designed by using the signal sending model and the performance model, respectively. To motivate content providers to participate in D 2 D content sharing. In the SCSI mechanism, the optimal policy of each content provider is derived to maximize the utility benefit of the content provider and to ensure that the benefit of the base station is not negative. In PRCSI, the agent and the principal sign the performance contract to urge the agent to work harder and solve the moral hazard caused by the hidden action. In two cooperative incentive mechanisms, SCSI and PRCSI, agents and principals both select optimal actions to reach Nash equilibrium. The simulation results show that SCSI and PRCSI can improve the receiving rate, increase the utility of agent and client, and make the content provider receive incentive. In this way, the spectral efficiency and communication rate of the system are greatly improved. And the agent's action accords with the choice of a rational marketer.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：TN929.5

【参考文献】