城市基础设施PPP监管体系研究

发布时间：2018-05-12 14:22

本文选题：城市基础设施 + PPP　；参考：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国正处于城镇化进程的快速发展阶段,仅靠现有的财政支出和地方政府投融资已无法填补城市基础设施建设的资金缺口。公私合作制(PPP)通过私人资金的引入,可以缓解政府财政压力,提高运营效率。但是,由于城市基础设施具有自然垄断性和准公共物品性,政府与社会资本的合作过程中存在很多风险因素,如果政府部门不能对其进行有效的监管,那么在城市基础设施PPP项目实施和运行过程中就容易产生市场失灵等问题,从而降低运营效率和服务质量,使消费者利益遭受损失。因此,建立科学完善的监管体系,对于城市基础设施公私合作模式的推行具有重要的意义。本文的主要内容有以下几个方面:1.在PPP基本特点和风险分析的基础上提出政府监管需求。从我国城市基础设施PPP的基本特点和风险因素出发,理清与政府监管密切相关的风险因素,包括政府政策变更风险、政府干预风险、政府信用风险、社会风险、道德风险等风险,并分析造成这些风险的主要原因。进而结合城市基础设施PPP的自然垄断性、社会性、盈利性和风险因素指出,为有效解决市场失灵和控制项目风险、调和城市基础设施的公共性与私人合作企业盈利性之间的矛盾,必须进行政府监管。2.深层次分析目前城市基础设施PPP监管存在的突出问题。通过对PPP相关政策法规的梳理指出现有的监管法律法规不健全,缺乏统一立法,政策衔接不够,导致现有的监管缺乏执法依据;通过对多个监管机构的博弈分析指出目前多监管机构职能交叉,势必会造成监管真空和监管重叠等现象;通过对文献的梳理,并结合监管现状指出目前监管随意性大,缺乏科学的监管绩效评价,将导致监管机构缺乏激励。3.通过案例对比分析总结监管经验教训以及对构建监管体系的启示。通过对北京地铁四号线和泉州刺桐大桥两个典型案例的对比研究分析,总结在城市基础设施PPP项目中的监管经验与教训,同时,针对泉州刺桐大桥监管过程中存在的突出问题,指出完善的监管法规、高效的监管机构和科学的监管绩效评价是进行有效监管的前提、条件和保障措施。4.构建了城市基础设施PPP监管体系。在对我国目前PPP监管体系存在的突出问题分析与案例对比分析的基础上,提出城市基础设施PPP监管体系的基本框架,并从立法目标与原则、立法架构和立法内容等方面探讨如何完善监管法规政策体系,从建立集权与分权有效结合的分层监管纵向权力配置机制、监管机构与政策性部门协调运行的横向权利配置机制探讨如何建立有效的监管机构体系,从监管绩效评价主体、评价客体、评价模型、评价实施探讨如何建立科学的监管绩效评价体系。本文可能在以下几个方面有所创新:(1)提出并论证了城市基础设施PPP监管体系的整体框架。本文探索性的从监管依据、监管主体和监管绩效三个方面构建了城市基础设施PPP监管体系,为实现政府有效监管提供理论基础和基本思路。(2)设计纵横有序的PPP监管机构体系。本文建立了集权与分权有效结合的分层监管纵向权力配置机制,监管机构与政策性部门协调运行的横向权利配置机制。从而在纵向和横向两方面实现对PPP监管机构体系的设计。(3)建立了科学的PPP监管绩效评价体系。本文认为应结合监管者、PPP合作企业和消费者,从监管投入和监管效果两方面对监管机构进行绩效评价。
[Abstract]:China is in the rapid development stage of urbanization process. Only the existing financial expenditure and local government investment and financing can not fill the capital gap of urban infrastructure construction. The public private partnership (PPP) can relieve the government financial pressure and improve the operation efficiency through the introduction of private funds. However, because of the natural infrastructure of the city, it is natural. There are many risk factors in the process of cooperation between government and social capital in the process of cooperation between government and social capital. If the government can not supervise it effectively, the market failure will easily occur in the implementation and operation of the urban infrastructure PPP project, which reduces the operating efficiency and service quality and makes the consumers benefit. Therefore, the establishment of a scientific and perfect regulatory system is of great significance to the implementation of the mode of public and private cooperation in urban infrastructure. The main contents of this paper are as follows: 1. on the basis of the basic characteristics of PPP and the risk analysis, the demand for government supervision is put forward. The basic characteristics and risks of the urban infrastructure PPP in China are based on the basic characteristics and risk analysis. To clarify the risk factors closely related to government regulation, including the risk of government policy change, government intervention risk, government credit risk, social risk, moral risk and so on, and analyze the main causes of these risks, and then combine the natural monopoly, sociality, profitability and risk factors of the urban infrastructure PPP. In order to effectively solve the problem of market failure and control project risk and to reconcile the contradiction between the public property of urban infrastructure and the profitability of private cooperative enterprises, the government supervision.2. must be carried out to deeply analyze the outstanding problems existing in the current urban infrastructure PPP supervision. The existing regulatory laws are pointed out through the combing of the policies and regulations of the PPP phase. The regulations are not perfect, lack of unified legislation and lack of policy cohesion, which leads to the lack of law enforcement basis. Through the game analysis of multiple regulatory agencies, it is pointed out that the overlapping of the supervision vacuum and supervision will result in the overlapping of supervision vacuum and supervision. The lack of scientific supervision performance evaluation will lead to the lack of incentive.3. supervision institutions to summarize the experience and lessons through case comparison and analysis of the supervision system. Through the comparison and analysis of the two typical cases of Beijing metro line four and Quanzhou Tung Tung bridge, this paper summarizes the supervision of the urban infrastructure facilities in the PPP project. At the same time, in view of the outstanding problems in the supervision process of Quanzhou tung tree bridge, the paper points out that the perfect regulation and regulation, the efficient supervision organization and the scientific supervision performance evaluation are the precondition of effective supervision, and the conditions and safeguard measures.4. construct the PPP supervision system of the urban infrastructure construction. In the current PPP supervision system in China On the basis of the analysis of the outstanding problems and the comparison and analysis of the cases, the basic framework of the PPP supervision system of urban infrastructure is put forward, and how to improve the regulatory system from the legislative objectives and principles, the legislative structure and the legislative content is discussed, and the vertical power allocation mechanism is regulated from the establishment of the effective combination of centralization and decentralization. The lateral rights allocation mechanism coordinated by the regulatory agency and the policy sector discusses how to establish an effective regulatory institutional system, from supervising performance evaluation subject, evaluation object, evaluation model, and evaluation implementation how to establish a scientific supervision performance evaluation system. This paper may be innovative in the following aspects: (1) put forward and demonstrate The overall framework of the PPP regulatory system of urban infrastructure. This paper constructs the PPP regulatory system of urban infrastructure from three aspects of supervision basis, supervision subject and supervision performance, which provides the theoretical basis and basic ideas for the realization of effective government supervision. (2) the design of PPP regulatory system with a sequence and sequence. The vertical power allocation mechanism is regulated by the division of power and power effectively, and the horizontal rights allocation mechanism of the regulatory agency and the policy sector is coordinated. The design of the PPP regulatory system is realized both vertically and horizontally. (3) a scientific performance evaluation system for the PPP supervision is established. This paper considers that the supervisor, the PPP cooperation enterprise and the PPP should be combined. Consumers conduct performance evaluation on regulatory agencies from two aspects of regulatory input and regulatory effectiveness.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F283

【参考文献】