控制权转移背景下高管更替对公司治理绩效的影响研究

发布时间：2018-06-09 12:33

本文选题：控制权转移 + 高管更替　；参考：《河南大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着2016年《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》的颁布,全年A股上市公司控制权转移事件高达58起,实际控制人及高管更替的新闻也屡现电视荧屏。但由于我国控制权市场体系尚不完备导致控制权转移效率低下,公司治理绩效难以判别。我国高管人员大多由控股股东或政府行政任命,导致高管决策行为偏向团体利益而非公司利益。但随着法律体系及控制权市场的完善,管理低效率使高管人员面临被更替的威胁。充分发挥资源配置功能,更替不称职高管成为驱动公司控制权转移的关键因素。高管作为公司最主要的人力资本,处于公司权力核心地位并拥有公司经营权和决策权,堪比“掌舵人”。公司治理绩效往往取决于高管人员的管理和运营能力,为了实现利润最大化,所有者会采取一定的激励措施增加代理人的忠实度并以此降低代理成本。同时设计适当的监督机制对高管人员进行业绩考核,及时更替无效率、不称职高管,优化公司治理结构以提高绩效水平。高管更替对治理绩效起到了不容小觑的影响,因此如何在公司治理结构变革和调整中正确定位高管人员,高管更替对公司治理绩效产生何种影响,早已成为公司治理领域的焦点。相关学者对高管更替与公司治理绩效进行研究,但目前仍未形成统一的结论。在相关理论基础上,以我国发生控制权转移的280家非金融A股上市公司为基础样本,运用指标体系法确定被解释变量,主要采用因子分析法以增加公司治理绩效指标的全面性和科学性,在全面梳理前人研究成果的基础上设计相关解释变量和控制变量,根据相关假设对构建模型进行描述性统计和二元Logistic回归分析,并采用更换被解释变量的方法对实证结果进行稳健性检验。实证结果表明控制权转移作为控制权市场一项活跃的经济活动,往往伴随着高管更替,且这一活动能有效改善公司治理绩效,是一种积极的公司治理措施。同时发现高管人员控股程度也会影响公司治理绩效,根据管理防御理论和管理层权力理论,股权过高会引起寻租行为导致公司价值毁损,由此得出了高管持股比例越大公司治理绩效越差的结论。最后结合我国控制权市场发展现状提出了促进控制权市场有效运行对策及可行性建议。希望能够为完善我国上市公司治理结构,优化控制权市场环境提供理论依据。
[Abstract]:With the promulgation of the "measures for the Management of Major assets reorganization of listed companies" in 2016, 58 cases of transfer of control of A-share listed companies occurred in the whole year, and the news of the turnover of actual controllers and executives also appeared repeatedly on television screens. However, due to the incompleteness of the market system of control rights in China, the efficiency of control transfer is low, and the performance of corporate governance is difficult to judge. Most senior executives in China are appointed by controlling shareholders or the government, which results in executives' decision-making in favor of group interests rather than corporate interests. But with the improvement of the legal system and the market of control, management inefficiency threatens the replacement of executives. Giving full play to the function of resource allocation and replacing incompetent executives are the key factors driving the transfer of corporate control. As the most important human capital of the company, executives are at the core of the company's power and have the power to operate and make decisions, which is comparable to the "leader". Corporate governance performance often depends on the management and operation ability of executives. In order to maximize profits, owners will take certain incentives to increase the loyalty of agents and thus reduce agency costs. At the same time, we design a proper supervision mechanism to evaluate the performance of the executives, to replace the inefficient and incompetent executives in time, and to optimize the corporate governance structure to improve the performance level. The turnover of senior executives has played an important role in governance performance, so how to correctly position the senior executives in the transformation and adjustment of corporate governance structure, and how to influence the corporate governance performance by the turnover of senior executives? Has become the focus of corporate governance. Relevant scholars study on the turnover of executives and corporate governance performance, but there is still no unified conclusion. On the basis of relevant theories, 280 non-financial A-share listed companies in our country are taken as the basic samples, and the explained variables are determined by the method of index system. This paper mainly adopts factor analysis method to increase the comprehensiveness and scientificalness of corporate governance performance index, and designs related explanatory variables and control variables on the basis of combing the previous research results. According to the relevant assumptions, descriptive statistics and binary logistic regression analysis were carried out to construct the model, and the method of replacing the explained variables was used to test the robustness of the empirical results. The empirical results show that as an active economic activity in the control market, the transfer of control is often accompanied by the turnover of executives, and this activity can effectively improve the performance of corporate governance, and it is an active measure of corporate governance. At the same time, it is found that the controlling degree of senior managers will also affect corporate governance performance. According to management defense theory and management power theory, excessive equity rights will lead to rent-seeking behavior leading to the destruction of corporate value. From this, we draw the conclusion that the bigger the proportion of senior management is, the worse the corporate governance performance is. Finally, combined with the development of China's control market, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and feasible suggestions to promote the effective operation of the control market. This paper hopes to provide theoretical basis for perfecting the governance structure of listed companies and optimizing the market environment of control rights.
【学位授予单位】：河南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F832.51;F272.91

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