群体活动中“榜样的力量”是无穷的吗——来自一项动态公共品博弈实验的证据

发布时间：2018-06-16 22:51

本文选题：社会偏好 + 领导机制　；参考：《财贸经济》2017年12期

【摘要】：群体活动中我们会重视榜样人物的示范带头作用。本文在经典的公共品自愿捐献实验中加入了榜样先行机制,构造一个动态公共品博弈的实验模型,研究先行者的"榜样"行为对公共品捐献绩效的影响问题。与多数研究成果类似,本文的研究表明,有先行者的榜样作用相比于无先行者的情况,对公共品捐献有显著促进作用;且在先行者选择上,轮流担任和投票选举先行者带来的捐献效果要明显优于随机产生先行者的情况。但我们的研究还表明,个体社会偏好的异质性也对公共品捐献绩效影响显著:条件合作者和驼峰型偏好者的捐献绩效优于搭便车者,但民主选举产生先行者的方式有助于纠正搭便车者的投机倾向。
[Abstract]:We will attach importance to the role of role models in group activities. In this paper, an experimental model of dynamic public goods game is constructed to study the influence of the forerunner's "role model" behavior on the performance of public goods donation by adding an example first mechanism in the classical public goods voluntary donation experiment. Similar to most research results, the research in this paper shows that the role of the forerunner has a significant role in promoting public goods donation than in the case of no forerunner, and in the choice of the forerunner, The contribution effect of rotation and voting for forerunner is better than that of random forerunner. But our study also shows that the heterogeneity of individual social preferences also has a significant impact on the performance of public goods donation: conditional collaborators and humpback preference have better donor performance than hitchhikers. But the way in which democratic elections lead the way helps to correct the speculative tendencies of hitchhikers.
【作者单位】：北京大学经济学院;
【分类号】：F062.6

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