基于委托代理理论的众包奖金模式研究
发布时间：2018-11-03 15:29
【摘要】：基于委托代理理论,以单人中标悬赏模式为例,分析了固定奖金在众包中适用的原因;在线性委托代理模型中加入参与者技能水平、任务难易程度以及精神激励等变量,探讨了绩效奖金中参与者努力程度和发包方激励系数的影响因素.结果表明:参与者技能水平、竞争性的环境、个人兴趣、激励系数正向影响参与者的努力水平,而成本系数和任务的难易程度负向影响参与者的努力水平;参与者技能水平正向影响激励系数,而竞争性的环境、个人兴趣、风险规避度、任务的难易程度、成本系数负向影响激励系数.
[Abstract]:Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the reasons why the fixed bonus is applicable in crowdsourcing, taking the reward model of single winning bid as an example. In the linear principal-agent model, variables such as participants' skill level, task difficulty and mental motivation are added to the model, and the factors influencing the participants' effort and the incentive coefficient of the payer are discussed. The results show that the skill level of participants, competitive environment, personal interest, incentive coefficient positively affect the effort level of participants, while the cost coefficient and task difficulty degree negatively affect the effort level of participants; Participants' skill level positively affects incentive coefficient, while competitive environment, personal interest, risk aversion, task difficulty and cost coefficient negatively affect incentive coefficient.
【作者单位】： 中南民族大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助项目(12BGL046) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(CSZ11005)
【分类号】：F272.92
[Abstract]:Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the reasons why the fixed bonus is applicable in crowdsourcing, taking the reward model of single winning bid as an example. In the linear principal-agent model, variables such as participants' skill level, task difficulty and mental motivation are added to the model, and the factors influencing the participants' effort and the incentive coefficient of the payer are discussed. The results show that the skill level of participants, competitive environment, personal interest, incentive coefficient positively affect the effort level of participants, while the cost coefficient and task difficulty degree negatively affect the effort level of participants; Participants' skill level positively affects incentive coefficient, while competitive environment, personal interest, risk aversion, task difficulty and cost coefficient negatively affect incentive coefficient.
【作者单位】： 中南民族大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助项目(12BGL046) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(CSZ11005)
【分类号】：F272.92
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