基于胜任力的薪酬激励机制设计及激励协同
发布时间：2018-12-24 16:28
【摘要】：知识经济时代,基于胜任力的薪酬激励体系备受学术界和实践界关注。但是由于信息不对称,员工真正的胜任力水平如何被组织识别一直是其难题。不同于以往的胜任力识别依赖行为面试等主观判断方法,基于委托代理理论,构建了能区分不同胜任力的应用型主动激励模型。即由委托人事先设计薪酬激励机制,通过对不同胜任力的员工采用分离均衡式契约安排,诱使代理人主动选择对应的绩效产出和薪酬,从而实现委托人和代理人共赢的结果,即员工效益最大化时组织也达到了效益最大化。该机制使得组织准确地实现胜任力与薪酬挂钩,改变了传统的胜任力主观评估引起的偏差现象,减少了委托代理双方的博弈风险,实现了组织和员工的激励协同。研究结论对组织激励机制研究以及组织和员工激励目标协同均具有重要启示和意义。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, the salary incentive system based on competence has attracted much attention from academic and practical circles. However, due to asymmetric information, how to identify the real competence of employees by the organization has always been a difficult problem. Different from the previous subjective judgment methods such as competence identification dependent behavior interview and based on the principal-agent theory an applied active incentive model which can distinguish different competencies is constructed. That is to say, the principal designs the salary incentive mechanism in advance, through adopting the separate and balanced contract arrangement to the employees with different competence, induces the agent to choose the corresponding performance output and the salary voluntarily, thus realizes the principal and the agent to win together the result. That is, when the employee benefit maximizes, the organization also achieves the benefit maximization. This mechanism makes the organization realize the link between competence and salary accurately, changes the deviation phenomenon caused by the traditional subjective evaluation of competence, reduces the game risk between the principal-agent and the agent, and realizes the incentive coordination between the organization and the staff. The conclusion has important implications for the study of organizational incentive mechanism and the synergy of incentive goals between organizations and employees.
【作者单位】： 上海交通大学国家战略研究院;上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;
【基金】：中国科学院学部咨询评议项目“‘一带一路’建设相关科技支撑问题研究”(17Z20320037) 上海交通大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助文理交叉项目(17JCYA19) 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602140)
【分类号】：F272.92
，
本文编号：2390827
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, the salary incentive system based on competence has attracted much attention from academic and practical circles. However, due to asymmetric information, how to identify the real competence of employees by the organization has always been a difficult problem. Different from the previous subjective judgment methods such as competence identification dependent behavior interview and based on the principal-agent theory an applied active incentive model which can distinguish different competencies is constructed. That is to say, the principal designs the salary incentive mechanism in advance, through adopting the separate and balanced contract arrangement to the employees with different competence, induces the agent to choose the corresponding performance output and the salary voluntarily, thus realizes the principal and the agent to win together the result. That is, when the employee benefit maximizes, the organization also achieves the benefit maximization. This mechanism makes the organization realize the link between competence and salary accurately, changes the deviation phenomenon caused by the traditional subjective evaluation of competence, reduces the game risk between the principal-agent and the agent, and realizes the incentive coordination between the organization and the staff. The conclusion has important implications for the study of organizational incentive mechanism and the synergy of incentive goals between organizations and employees.
【作者单位】： 上海交通大学国家战略研究院;上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;
【基金】：中国科学院学部咨询评议项目“‘一带一路’建设相关科技支撑问题研究”(17Z20320037) 上海交通大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助文理交叉项目(17JCYA19) 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602140)
【分类号】：F272.92
，
本文编号：2390827
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/jixiaoguanli/2390827.html
