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独立董事与CEO的地缘关系对并购绩效的影响

发布时间:2019-07-10 11:16
【摘要】:独立董事制度作为降低代理成本,提升公司治理水平的制度安排,有利于提高管理层在做出并购等涉及公司重大投资经营决策时的决策科学性,从而提高经营业绩,其对企业并购绩效的重要性不言而喻。然而,独立董事能否切实履行其职能却可能受到独立董事与包括CEO在内的管理层之间社会关系的影响,这直接关系到公司的治理水平和经营业绩。社会关系如何度量是一个现实问题,因为它可以包括校友、同乡甚至军队战友在内的多种关系,具有不确定性。与社会关系不同的是,地缘关系是社会关系的承载,具有外生性。因此,将地缘关系作为社会关系代理变量研究独立董事在并购中的作用是一个更具有可操作性的方向。本文以收购方公司内部的独立董事与CEO个体之间的地缘关系为研究的切入点,通过对首次公告日在2005年-2012年期间上市公司并购非上市公司的并购事件作为样本的实证研究,探讨了与CEO具有地缘关系的独立董事能否真正履行其职责,从而影响并购绩效。本文的主要发现是:一、收购方公司的独立董事与CEO具有地缘关系确能影响并购绩效。如收购方聘请与CEO存在地缘关系的独立董事,会对并购绩效有不利的影响,且独立董事与CEO具有地缘关系的公司,比没有地缘关系的并购绩效低3.2%。二、根据分样本结果,地缘关系的并购绩效受以下因素的影响:独立董事的在职时间越短,并购绩效越差;独立董事的年龄越小,并购绩效越差;收购方公司的规模越小,并购绩效越差;收购方所在地市场化指数越低,并购绩效越差;收购方所在地政治干预指数越高,并购绩效越差。本文从独立董事与CEO的地缘关系出发,为独立董事与CEO之间的社会关系找到了—个新的度量方法。本文的研究验证了独立董事的地域特征可以影响独立董事职能的发挥进而影响并购绩效,从而为完善上市公司的独立董事制度,提高公司的治理水平提供了借鉴意义。
[Abstract]:The independent director system, as a system arrangement to reduce the agent cost and improve the corporate governance level, is beneficial to the improvement of the decision-making science of the management in the decision-making of the major investment operation of the company, such as M & A and so on, so as to improve the operation performance, and the importance of the independent director system to the enterprise's M & A performance is self-evident. However, the ability of independent directors to effectively perform their functions may be affected by the social relationship between independent directors and management, including the CEO, which is directly related to the level of governance and performance of the company. The measure of social relations is a real problem, because it can include many kinds of relations, including the alumni, the same township and even the army comrades-in-arms, and has the uncertainty. In contrast to the social relations, the relationship between the land and the land is the bearing of the social relations, and has the external character. Therefore, the role of the independent director in the M & A is a more operable way to study the relationship as a proxy variable of the social relationship. In this paper, based on the relationship between the independent director and the CEO in the acquirer's company, this paper makes an empirical study on the acquisition and acquisition of non-listed companies by the listed companies in the period from 2005 to 2012. The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the independent director with the relationship with the CEO can truly perform his/ her duties, thus affecting the performance of the M & A. The main findings of this paper are as follows:1. The relationship between the independent director of the purchaser and the CEO can affect the performance of the M & A. If the purchaser employs an independent director with a relationship with the CEO, it will have a negative impact on the performance of the M & A, and the independent director and the CEO have a relationship with the CEO, which is 3.2% lower than the acquisition performance without the relationship. 2. Based on the results of the sub-samples, the M & A performance of the land relationship is affected by the following factors: the shorter the in-service time of the independent director and the worse the acquisition performance; the smaller the age of the independent director, the worse the acquisition performance; and the smaller the size of the acquirer's company, the worse the acquisition performance; The lower the market index of the purchaser is, the worse the M & A performance is; the higher the political interference index of the purchaser is, the worse the M & A performance. Based on the relationship between the independent director and the CEO, this paper finds a new measure method for the relationship between the independent director and the CEO. The research in this paper proves that the geographical characteristics of independent directors can influence the function of independent director and influence the performance of merger and acquisition, so as to provide reference for improving the independent director system of the listed company and improving the corporate governance level.
【学位授予单位】:上海外国语大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F271;F271

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