标准化技术的许可治理与研发策略研究

发布时间：2019-05-16 21:45

【摘要】：在当今知识产权主导的技术环境中,技术标准与专利技术的结合成为电子、通讯等高科技产业内的发展趋势。在这一背景下,技术标准的通用性与专利技术的私权性成为一对基本矛盾,贯穿标准化实施的始末。标准一经制定,标准厂商必须获得关键专利技术的让渡或许可方能进行生产和销售,否则将面临严厉的专利侵权赔偿。由于上述基本矛盾的存在,从20世纪90年代至今,在相关产业内关于标准化技术许可的纠纷和争议就从未终止,技术许可的规制函待完善；另一方面,作为WTO的主要成员国,我国已经充分融入了世界性的标准化进程。而且,我国企业一般作为专利技术的被许可方,属于技术后进者。在多层次的技术溢出条件下,如何适时地调整许可和研发策略,以实现自身的技术积累,是当前我国高新技术企业急需解决的问题。针对这两方面,本文展开了全面和细致的研究,具体可分为三个研究板块： (1)奠基性研究。首先介绍了知识产权与技术标准结合的研究背景,以及技术标准化实施中存在的专利丛林和专利劫持两类问题。针对以上问题,引出合作性技术标准化的组织形式和各自的职能。标准一经制定,相关专利权人往往凭借其市场力的提升,索取远高于自身专利技术价值的费用。有鉴于此,SSO为了规范标准技术市场提出了披露规则和FRAND规则。本文着重分析了在事后专利劫持、双边许可协商和事前技术竞争等经济情境下FRAND规则的多重含义。最后,以各种情境下专利权人和标准用户之间的制衡关系为基础,提出进一步的政策建议。 (2)模型研究。在前一阶段的研究中,将技术许可的改进方向确定为事前许可协商。在同质投资的观点下,通过一个序贯投资模型刻画了事前协商下许可双方的收益和投资激励,并导致了双边劫持的结果。为了优化许可程序,进一步考察了事前许可协商的实施对研发和生产的影响；并确定了有效率投资下事前协商的适用范围。研究得出以下结论：(1)事前协商下联合预期盈余提高,对厂商的劫持被克服；(2)短期实施提高厂商投资和技术价值,事前协商可行；长期实施导致研发阻滞,事前协商可行性较差。在技术标准化的实施中,普遍存在着技术领先者对后进者的技术溢出。在合约理论的框架内研究了标准化技术许可的演进：采用一个双边序贯投资模型刻画了许可双方在单向许可下的得益和投资激励,并导致了劫持的后果。之后,基于后进者对核心技术进行局部改进的假设,引入回馈许可机制,并分别考察这一制度下许可双方的收益和研发状况。研究指出：(1)由于后进者谈判力的提升,领先者愿意与之进行交叉许可；(2)上述劫持被克服,后进者的投资和研发激励均得到提高。最后,对后进者提出了进一步的政策建议。 (3)实证研究。这一部分的研究任务是映证模型研究中提出的结论和相关的政策建议。首先,通过采集四个标准制定组织(SSO)披露的专利信息,并以专利引证的方法研究了相关技术在前后相继的3个代际间的绩效,并与非代际标准作比较。随后,对GSM国际性标准展开案例研究,从技术标准的演进和技术偏转两个方向进行论述。案例研究充分证实了双向许可对技术集群的偏转作用。至此,模型研究中的研究假设和主要研究结论都得到了证实。在本研究的最后,建立了标准化技术评价体系。基于前期的研究成果,模拟当下大型SSO中的标准化技术的演变过程,给出技术评价的基本步骤和应用模式；最后,将实证数据导入模型,完成一份算例分析。该模拟实验对于标准化实施中的技术后进者有重要的参考价值和指导意义。
[Abstract]:In the current intellectual property-oriented technology environment, the combination of the technical standard and the patent technology has become the developing trend in the high-tech industries such as electronic and communication. In this background, the universality of the technical standard and the proprietary rights of the patent technology become a pair of basic contradictions, through the beginning of the standardized implementation. Once the standard is established, the standard manufacturer must obtain the transfer of the key patent technology, and may be able to make production and sale, or it will face severe patent infringement compensation. As a result of the above-mentioned basic contradiction, since the 1990s, the disputes and disputes concerning the licensing of the standardization technology in the relevant industries have never been terminated, and the regulatory letter of the technology license is to be improved; on the other hand, as the main member of the WTO, My country has fully integrated into the universal process of standardization. In addition, our country is generally regarded as the licensee of the patent technology, and belongs to the technical back-in person. Under the condition of multi-level technology overflow, how to timely adjust the license and R & D strategy to realize its own technology accumulation is the problem that the high-tech enterprises in our country need to solve urgently. In view of these two aspects, this paper has carried out a comprehensive and detailed study, which can be divided into three research plates: (1) The foundation of the foundation The paper first introduces the research background of the combination of the intellectual property and the technical standard, and the patent jungles and patent hijackings existing in the implementation of the technology standardization. In the light of the above questions, the organizational form and their respective positions for the standardization of cooperative technologies are drawn out. As soon as the standard is established, the relevant patentee is often able to obtain a fee that is much higher than the value of its own patent technology by virtue of the promotion of its market force For this reason, SSO provides the disclosure rules and the FRAD rules for the specification of the standard technical market In this paper, the multiple content of the FRND rule in the economic situation such as the post-patent hijacking, the bilateral license negotiation and the prior-technology competition is analyzed. Finally, based on the balance between the patentee and the standard user in various situations, a further policy construction is put forward. discussion on (2) Type of study. In the previous phase of the study, the direction of improvement of the technical license was determined as prior Negotiable. In the perspective of homogeneous investment, through a sequential investment model, a sequential investment model is adopted to describe the benefits and investment incentives of the two parties in advance and lead to bilateral hijackings. As a result, in order to optimize the licensing procedure, the effect of the prior permission consultation on the R & D and production is further investigated, and the prior consultation in the effective investment is determined. Using the scope, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) the joint expected surplus is improved under the prior consultation, and the hijack of the manufacturer is overcome; (2) the short-term implementation increases the investment and technical value of the manufacturers, and the prior consultation is feasible; and the long-term implementation leads to the R & D block, and the prior consultation is feasible Poor performance. In the implementation of the technology standardization, the technology leader is ubiquitous in the back-in In the framework of the contract theory, the evolution of the standardization technology license is studied: a bilateral sequential investment model is adopted to describe the benefit and investment incentive of the two parties under the one-way license, After that, based on the postplayer's assumption of local improvement of the core technology, the feedback licensing mechanism is introduced, and the benefits of the two parties under this system are examined separately. The research points out that: (1) the leader is willing to cross-license with it because of the promotion of the latter's negotiation power; (2) the above-mentioned hijack is overcome, and the investment and research and development incentive of the latter and finally, the back-in person is further provided with a further Policy recommendations. (3) An empirical study. The research task of this part is the conclusion and conclusion in the research of the model. Firstly, the patent information disclosed by the four standard establishment organizations (SSO) is collected, and the performance of the relevant technologies between the three generations before and after it is studied by the method of patent citation, and is not The comparison of the inter-generational standards. Then, the case study of the GSM international standard is carried out, from the evolution of the technical standard and the technical deflection. The case study fully demonstrates the two-way license pair technology The deflection of the cluster. So far, the research hypothesis and main study in the model research The theory has been proved. At the end of this study, it was established The standardization technology evaluation system is based on the previous research results, and simulates the evolution process of the standardization technology in the current large-scale SSO, and gives the basic steps and the application mode of the technical evaluation; and finally, the empirical data is imported into the model And an example analysis is completed. The simulation experiment is of great importance to the technical backers in the standardized implementation.
【学位授予单位】：中南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：G307

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