基于多任务委托代理模型的导游激励问题研究

发布时间：2018-03-10 01:02

本文选题：旅游管理　切入点：导游人员激励　出处：《运筹与管理》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：运用多任务委托代理模型研究导游最优激励合同后得出,当小费、回扣为旅行社带来直接收益的情况时,在激励相容条件下,导游引导游览活动的最优激励合同是其绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数;导游赢得小费活动的最优激励合同为"临界型激励合同",即只有当导游所创造的收益超过某临界值,对其的激励才是正向的,若小于该临界值,激励将是负向的;导游获取回扣活动的最优激励合同只与其完成回扣任务的业绩有关;当小费和回扣不为旅行社带来直接收益的情况时,那么在激励相容条件下,导游在小费和回扣活动上的努力依赖于激励报酬,而且导游的最优激励合同与其在小费和回扣活动上的收益无关。
[Abstract]:Using the multi-task principal-agent model to study the optimal incentive contract for tour guides, it is concluded that when tipping and rebate bring direct benefits to the travel agency, under the condition of incentive compatibility, The optimal incentive contract for guided tours is the decreasing function of absolute risk aversion, marginal incentive cost change rate and variance of observable variables. The optimal incentive contract for tipping is "critical incentive contract", that is, only if the income created by the guide exceeds a certain critical value, the incentive is positive, if less than the critical value, the incentive will be negative; The optimal incentive contract for tour guides to obtain rebates is only related to their performance in completing the rebate task; when tipping and kickbacks do not bring direct benefits to the travel agency, then under the incentive compatibility condition, The efforts of tour guides in tipping and rebate activities depend on incentive pay, and the optimal incentive contract is not related to the benefits of tipping and rebate activities.
【作者单位】：山东大学历史文化学院文化产业管理系;山东大学管理学院信息管理系;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71201093) 山东大学自主创新基金(IFYT12031)
【分类号】：F592.6

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