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品牌溢价和混合渠道环境下OEM供应链的协调模型和机制研究

发布时间:2018-02-12 05:53

  本文关键词: OEM供应链 质量水平 品牌溢价 混合渠道 协调机制 出处:《南京航空航天大学》2014年博士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:在市场经济带来的贸易全球化、生产全球化和企业全球化的背景下,企业需要面对竞争越来越激烈的复杂环境。买方市场需求的波动性以及个性化需求的凸显催生了技术进步及扩散速度、产品更新换代速度的加快,企业生存需要面临着缩短交货期、提高产品质量、降低成本和改进服务等挑战。要在这激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地,企业必须准确把握、及时响应竞争的焦点,不断地开发出满足用户需求的产品。然而,单个企业单纯靠自身的资源难以应对这富于变化的市场,传统的供应链也表现出了难以适应的窘态,以剥离弱势、打造优势业务为核心的专业化联盟的OEM供应链在满足市场需求方面显现了生存优势。针对品牌溢价和混合渠道环境下OEM供应链的协调问题,本文构造了以质量—品牌—渠道为脉络的逻辑结构展开深入研究。面向市场,品牌的保值、增值是OEM供应链关心的核心问题,产品质量既影响产品的销售价格又影响需求是品牌溢价表现的两个重要方面,通过提高产品质量获得高的销售价格、主导市场需求无疑是OEM供应链的理想追求,然而,供应链合作双方属于各自独立的决策主体,在权衡付出和收益之间存在着个体理性与集体理性的冲突,本文以产品质量的品牌溢价效应既影响销售价格又影响市场需求为切入点,以通过贴牌生产实现合作双方的收益改善为目的,运用博弈论、委托代理理论、优化方法、契约理论等理论工具,探讨了品牌商检测水平和检测概率有限下的提高制造商产品质量水平选择的策略、品牌商分担制造商质量投资成本以改进质量、扩大市场需求的策略,进一步研究对双方共同努力实现品牌溢价进行分配的品牌溢价共享契约,分析契约的有效性及其参数条件;针对制造商会在传统贴牌渠道外开展直销渠道而形成的混合渠道,作为供应链领导者的品牌商需与制造商之间建立有效的协调机制,以实现双方的“双赢”。本文的研究主要包括以下几个方面:(1)提高OEM供应链产品品牌溢价的质量改进策略。制造商基于成本考虑,会选择生产某种质量水平的产品,以最小化自身付出的总质量成本;而高质量能够通过高溢价而获得高利润,因此品牌商更加注重提供高质量的产品。在品牌商的检测水平有限和外部损失分担的情况下,研究了OEM供应链质量决策主体之间的决策依赖性和行为诱导性,为改善产品质量、提高品牌溢价提供策略选择。(2)质量的品牌溢价效应影响需求的成本分担协调。基于质量—成本、质量—需求关系的研究,通过OEM供应链学习曲线效应将质量、需求、成本联系在一起,构造质量的品牌溢价效应影响需求的函数,在质量影响投资成本和需求的双重关系下,以集中决策和分散决策为比较标准,通过供应链总利润最大化下的最优决策、各自利润最大化下的最优决策,研究投资成本分担策略使品牌商、制造商和OEM供应链总利润较分散决策Pareto改进的条件。(3)品牌溢价共享的收益分配研究。构造由品牌商和制造商共同努力实现的品牌溢价函数,对于品牌溢价的分配这一现实问题,给出了以一般批发价格加品牌溢价共享的价格契约,对品牌商和制造商分别从个体理性和集体理性出发选择努力水平的收益进行博弈,得到收益的博弈矩阵。通过个体收益的比较,得出均衡解下最优品牌溢价分配比例的影响因素及其对品牌商、制造商和OEM供应链收益的影响;通过整体收益的比较发现个体收益比较下得出的均衡解存在的不足,探索一定影响因素条件下的品牌溢价分配比例作为规避双方道德风险的协调契约,以实现双方收益的共同改进。(4)混合渠道的协调。为了迎合消费者需求的异质性和在与品牌商的博弈中争取一定的地位,制造商会在传统的贴牌渠道外发展直接面向消费者的直销渠道,从而形成OEM供应链的混合渠道,制造商开辟的直销渠道会分流掉一部分传统贴牌渠道的消费者,使得制造商既是品牌商的合作伙伴又是品牌商的竞争对手。针对品牌商主导且考虑品牌溢价的制造商开辟直销渠道的情况,需要研究混合渠道结构的构建基础,找出各自需要具备的优势和相互作用的优化机理;通过混合渠道的分散决策与集中决策的比较,分析混合渠道双方收益的改进空间,研究能够实现品牌商和制造商收益Pareto改进并实现混合渠道OEM供应链总利润最大化的完美协调机制。
[Abstract]:In the market economy and trade globalization, production globalization and enterprises under the background of globalization, the complex environment enterprises need to face increasingly fierce competition. The market demand volatility and the demand for personalized highlights spawned technological progress and diffusion rate, product replacement fast, enterprise survival needs shorten delivery time, improve product quality, reduce costs and improve service and other challenges. In an invincible position in the fierce market competition, the enterprise must accurately grasp the focus of a timely response to the competition, constantly developed to meet user demand for products. However, individual enterprises simply rely on their own resources to cope with the changing market, traditional supply the chain also showed it is difficult to adapt to the embarrassment, to remove the weak advantage as the core business of professional league OEM in supply chain to meet the market The demand side show survival advantage. According to the coordination of OEM supply chain brand premium and mixed channel environment, this paper constructs the quality brand channels for the logical structure of context studies. Market oriented, brand value, value chain is the core issue about the supply of OEM, the quality of the products not only affect the sales of the product the price and demand are two important aspects of brand premium performance, high sales price by improving product quality, leading the market demand is undoubtedly OEM supply chain's pursuit of ideal, however, supply chain cooperation between the two sides belong to their respective independent decision-making body, the trade-off between the costs and benefits there is a conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality in this paper, premium brand product quality not only affects the sales prices affect the market demand as the starting point, to realize the cooperation between the two sides through OEM revenue For the purpose of improving, using the game theory, principal-agent theory, optimization method, theory of contract theory, discusses the strategy of brands testing level and improve the quality level of product manufacturers limited probability of selection under the brand share of manufacturers of quality investment to improve quality, expand the market demand strategy, further research on both sides to realize the brand premium distribution brand premium sharing contract, contract validity analysis and parameter conditions; mixed channels for manufacturers in the traditional OEM channels to carry out direct sales channels formed, as between the supply chain leader brands and manufacturers need to establish an effective coordination mechanism, the two sides in order to achieve "win-win" in this paper. The research mainly includes the following aspects: (1) to improve the quality of OEM supply chain product brand premium manufacturer based on improved strategy. This consideration, will choose to produce a quality product, the total quality cost to minimize their pay; and high quality can obtain high profits through high premium brands, so pay more attention to provide high quality products. In the brand's detection level is limited and the external loss sharing case study between OEM supply chain quality decision-making decision dependence and induced behavior, to improve product quality, improve the brand premium strategy choice. (2) the cost of premium brand quality influence demand sharing coordination. The research is based on the quality, quality demand relationship, through the OEM supply chain learning curve effect quality the cost, demand, together, affect the demand function of premium brand construction quality, double investment in quality cost and demand, with centralized decision-making and decision-making for the comparison of dispersion The optimal decision criteria, total profit of the supply chain to maximize the profit maximization under their optimal decisions, investment cost sharing strategy of brands, total profits of manufacturers and OEM supply chain is decentralized Pareto improved conditions. (3) study on the income distribution structure. By sharing brand premium brands and manufacturers efforts to achieve the brand premium function, for the problem of distribution of brand premium, given to the general wholesale price plus the premium brand share price contract, the brand and manufacturer respectively from the individual rationality and collective rationality choice of effort level of the income of the game, get the game matrix. Through the comparison of individual income income the obtained equilibrium factors under the influence of the optimal allocation proportion of premium brand and brand influence, manufacturers and OEM supply chain revenue; by comparing the overall revenue To find out the problems of individual income compared with the equilibrium solution of the coordination contract explore brand premium distribution ratio under the condition of certain influence factors as to avoid the moral risk, to achieve mutual benefits for both sides to improve. (4) coordination of hybrid channels. In order to cater to the heterogeneity of consumer demand and strive for a certain position in the game with the brands, manufacturers development of direct sales channels directly to consumers in the traditional OEM channels, thereby forming a OEM hybrid channel supply chain, manufacturers direct sales channels opened will be split off part of the traditional OEM channels to consumers, the brand manufacturers is not only business partners and brand competition. The leading brands and consider the premium brand manufacturers to open up sales channels, to build on the hybrid channel structure, to find out their needs with The optimization mechanism of advantages and interaction preparation; through the comparison of decentralized decision and centralized decision mixed channels, analysis of improved hybrid channels both benefits, research can achieve the maximization of total profit of OEM hybrid channels supply chain and improve the brand and manufacturer profits Pareto the perfect coordination mechanism.

【学位授予单位】:南京航空航天大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F274;F224

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