汽车零部件零售商自有品牌对零售商制造商影响博弈分析

发布时间：2018-06-04 08:39

本文选题：博弈论 + 汽车零部件　；参考：《长安大学》2009年硕士论文

【摘要】： 我国汽车产业的快速增长带动了汽车零部件行业迅速发展,汽车零部件零售企业实力不断增强。随着零售业集约化程度的提高以及行业竞争的加剧,在零售商具有一定的规模、资金和管理经验等后,为了寻求新的利润增长点,越来越多的汽车零部件零售商在销售其他品牌产品的同时,开始试图通过反向一体化战略将经营触角延伸至生产领域开发零售商自有品牌是有可能的,一方面通过销售其他制造商品牌的零部件产品来增加自己的利润,另一方面,通过其他零部件厂商定制生产或贴牌自有品牌产品进行销售,来获取利润和树立自己的品牌效应。但是如何把握自有品牌和其他品牌之间的关系,这是本文研究的意义所在。本文运用博弈论相关理论研究了在一个零售商和两个制造商组成的汽车零部件分配渠道中,零售商引入自有品牌对零售商和制造商的影响,博弈的过程是两个制造商和零售商分别进行博弈,属于两方博弈。零售商引入自有品牌之前,零售商仅仅销售两个相互竞争的制造商品牌产品;引入自有品牌后,零售商不仅销售存在相互竞争的两个制造商品牌产品,同时也销售自有品牌产品。首先,论文分析了零售商引入自有品牌前后各品牌产品的市场需求量与价格关系,在考虑成本因素后,建立了两种情形下零售商和制造商的博弈模型,并运用斯坦克尔伯格动态博弈思想对模型进行了求解;其次,运用数理推导、matlab制图和数值模拟计算分析了各参数对制造商品牌产品和自有品牌产品的价格、市场需求量和利润的影响,并对引入自有品牌前后零售商和制造商的收益进行了对比分析。论文分析结果表明:汽车零部件零售商引入自有品牌后,制造商品牌产品需求量下降,在一定条件下,自有品牌使得制造商品牌产品批发价格下降,从而降低制造商利润,但是,在自有品牌市场基本需求量较小并与制造商品牌产品交叉价格敏感度较低时,自有品牌使制造商利润上升;自有品牌对零售商来说,是把“双刃剑”,当自有品牌市场基本需求量较大,制造商品牌间交叉价格敏感度较小时,自有品牌将大大增加零售商利润;反之,自有品牌使得零售商利润下降。
[Abstract]:The rapid growth of automobile industry in China has led to the rapid development of auto parts industry, and the strength of automobile parts retail enterprises has been strengthened. With the intensification of retail trade and the intensification of competition in the industry, after retailers have certain scale, capital and management experience, in order to seek new profit growth, It is possible that more and more auto parts retailers, while selling other brand products, are trying to extend their reach to the production area through reverse integration strategy. On the one hand, it can increase its profit by selling other manufacturers' products, on the other hand, it can make profits and establish its own brand effect by other parts manufacturers to produce or label their own brand products. However, how to grasp the relationship between private brands and other brands is the significance of this study. In this paper, we use the game theory to study the influence of the retailers introducing their own brands on the retailers and manufacturers in the distribution channels of automobile parts, which are composed of one retailer and two manufacturers. The process of game is that two manufacturers and retailers play games, which belong to two parties. Before retailers introduce their own brands, retailers sell only two competing manufacturers' brand products; after the introduction of their own brands, retailers not only sell two competing manufacturers' brand products, At the same time also sell their own brand products. Firstly, the paper analyzes the relationship between the market demand and the price of each brand before and after the retailer introduces its own brand. After considering the cost factor, the game model between the retailer and the manufacturer is established. The model is solved by using the dynamic game theory of Steinkerberg. Secondly, the price of each parameter to the manufacturer's brand product and its own brand product is analyzed by mathematical derivation and numerical simulation. The influence of market demand and profit is analyzed, and the profit of retailers and manufacturers before and after the introduction of private brand is compared. The results show that the demand of manufacturer brand products decreases after the automobile parts retailer introduces its own brand, and under certain conditions, the wholesale price of the manufacturer brand product decreases, thereby reducing the manufacturer's profit. However, when the basic demand in the private brand market is small and the cross-price-sensitivity with the manufacturer's brand product is low, the private brand makes the manufacturer's profit rise, and the private brand is a "double-edged sword" for the retailer. When the demand of private brand market is large and the cross-price sensitivity between manufacturers is low, the self-brand will greatly increase the retailer's profit; conversely, the private brand will make the retailer's profit decline.
【学位授予单位】：长安大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F274;F426.471;F224.32

【引证文献】