生物医药公司研发投入与高管薪酬激励研究

发布时间：2018-05-03 09:34

本文选题：生物医药公司 + 研发投入　；参考：《东北财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：企业中的管理层和股东的委托代理冲突一直以来备受学者关注,而在解决如何缓解代理冲突的过程中,管理层薪酬是一个行之有效的角度。近些年来,随着管理层薪酬制度的逐步完善,对管理层实行长期的激励的企业越来越普遍。而且大量研究都在表明,长期性的薪酬激励将管理层和股东的利益紧密结合,不仅缓解了二者之间的委托代理冲突,而且还会影响着管理层的投资策略,突出表现在长期性和不稳定的投资。本文另辟蹊径,以委托代理理论和激励理论作为基石,从董事会设计薪酬方案来引导对创新起关键作用的高管决策者的行为作为切入点,让高管认识到提高研发投入是有利可图的事情,从而增强公司自主创新能力,丰富了有效激励高管注重公司竞争优势和长期利益的研究。在知识经济时代,技术创新的作用不言而喻,政府、企业与学术界都在关注如何提高企业的核心竞争力—技术创新能力。医药行业是一个具有战略性的支柱行业,其最主要的特征是新产品或新技术的出现,从而带动行业的发展。从某种程度上而言,医药公司的自主创新能力是公司成长和发展的关键因素。基于此,考虑到公司研发项目周期较长、不确定性较大等特点,高管会降低对研发投入的积极性,但如果公司董事会设计的薪酬激励方案侧重于鼓励长远发展,从而让高管意识到增大研发投入是一件有利可图的事情,这样就缓解高管规避研发投入的机会主义行为。本文就实证检验一下生物医药行业的薪酬方案,通过对2009-2011年中国生物医药上市公司研发投入强度和高管薪酬激励的实证考察,结果表明公司董事会通过薪酬方案鼓励公司高管提高研发投入强度以增强公自主创新能力。而且,研究表明公司薪酬方案更倾向于奖励提高研发投入强度的公司高管团队,而不是公司CEO。本文总共有六个部分。第一部分是绪论,构建了论文的研究框架,阐述了文章的创新点。第二部分主要介绍了研究的理论依据,界定了与论文主题相关的几个基本概念,阐述了研发投入与高管薪酬激励研究的相关理论,并梳理了国内外的相关文献。第三部分重点介绍了研发投入的现状。第四部分是研究设计,首先在理论分析的基础上提出相应的研究假设,接着开始介绍研究样本的选取与数据来源,同时在相关参考文献的基础上,对被解释变量、解释变量和控制变量进行了定义,提出了本文的研究模型。第五部分对实证结果进行了分析同时对回归结果进行稳健性检验。第六部分,阐述本文的研究结论,提出研究不足之处并对研究做了进一步展望。在国务院提出用15年时间进入创新型国家行列的总体目标的背景下,通过对生物医药行业研发投入与高管薪酬激励的研究,对于其他行业如何加大研发投入力度、提高自主创新能力产生一定的指导意义,同时丰富了有效激励高管注重公司竞争优势和长期利益这一重要的研究课题,期待未来这一研究领域有更多深入的研究出现。
[Abstract]:The management layer and the principal-agent conflict in the enterprise have always been paid attention to by the scholars. In the process of solving the agent conflict, the management salary is an effective angle. In recent years, with the gradual improvement of the management salary system, the enterprises that have long encouraged the management are becoming more and more common. A large number of studies have shown that long-term remuneration incentives combine the interests of management and shareholders closely, not only alleviates the conflict between the two parties, but also affects the investment strategy of the management, and highlights the long-term and unstable investment. Stone, from the design of the board of directors to guide the behavior of the executive decision-makers who play a key role in innovation as a breakthrough point, let the executives realize that improving R & D investment is a profitable thing, thus enhancing the company's independent innovation ability, and enriching the research that effectively motivate the executives to pay attention to the competitive advantage and long-term interests of the company.
In the era of knowledge economy, the role of technological innovation is self-evident. The government, the enterprise and the academia are concerned about how to improve the core competitiveness of the enterprises - the technological innovation ability. The pharmaceutical industry is a strategic pillar industry whose most important feature is the emergence of new products or new techniques, which will lead to the development of the industry. On the other hand, the independent innovation ability of the pharmaceutical company is the key factor for the growth and development of the company. Based on this, the executives will reduce the enthusiasm for R & D investment, considering that the company's R & D project cycle is long and the uncertainty is large, but if the salary incentive scheme designed by the board of directors focuses on encouraging long-term development, it will make the company high It is a profitable thing to realize the increase of R & D investment by the management. This will relieve the opportunist behavior of senior executives to avoid R & D investment. This paper empirically examines the salary scheme of the bio pharmaceutical industry, through an empirical study on the intensity of R & D investment and the incentive of executive compensation in the 2009-2011 year Chinese pharmaceutical listed companies. The board of directors of the company encouraged executives to increase their R & D input to enhance their capacity for public innovation through compensation schemes. Moreover, the research shows that the company's compensation scheme is more likely to reward the company's top management team, not the company CEO., to increase the intensity of R & D investment.
This article has six parts altogether. The first part is the introduction, which constructs the research framework of the paper and expounds the innovation point of the article. The second part mainly introduces the theoretical basis of the research, defines several basic concepts related to the topic of the paper, expounds the related theories of research and development input and executive compensation incentive, and combs the domestic and foreign countries. The third part focuses on the present situation of R & D input. The fourth part is the research design. First, it puts forward the corresponding research hypothesis on the basis of theoretical analysis, and then begins to introduce the selection and data sources of the research samples, and on the basis of the related references, the explanatory variables, the explanatory variables and the control variables are carried out. The fifth part analyses the results of the demonstration and tests the robustness of the regression results. The sixth part, expounds the conclusions of this paper, and puts forward the shortcomings of the research and makes a further prospect for the research.
Under the background of the State Council's overall goal of entering the ranks of innovative countries for 15 years, through the research on R & D investment and executive compensation incentive in the bio pharmaceutical industry, it has a certain guiding significance for other industries to increase R & D investment and improve the ability of independent innovation. At the same time, it enriches the effective incentives for executives to pay attention to it. The important research topic of the company's competitive advantages and long-term interests looks forward to more in-depth research in the future.

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F426.72

【参考文献】