装备制造业企业应对技术性贸易壁垒的差异化创新策略研究

发布时间：2018-07-08 09:23

本文选题：技术性贸易壁垒 + 装备制造业　；参考：《东北财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：在国际贸易的发展历程中,发展中国家与发达国家始终处于不平等的地位,发达国家基于自身利益考虑的贸易政策始终是国际贸易政策变化的风向标。进入21世纪,在全球贸易自由化的大背景下,贸易保护主义不但没有退出国际贸易的舞台,反而以更加灵活、更加隐蔽的形式--技术性贸易壁垒存在着。技术性贸易壁垒主要包括技术法规、标准和合格评定程序,表现出隐蔽性、合理性、灵活性、动态性、连锁性、差异性、争议性等特点,成为货物和服务自由贸易的障碍。起初的技术性贸易壁垒更多的是出于经济目的,随着不断应用和发展,技术性贸易壁垒的政治目的愈发明显,经济安全与政治安全不再是两个独立的安全领域,两者交集处于不断扩大的趋势。很大程度上,经济安全正在逐步取代政治安全,成为发达国家遏制发展中国家的主要途径。装备制造业作为制造业的核心,作为国民经济的发展支柱,是国家经济安全的核心领域,正成为发达国家干预发展中国家发展的新领域。以欧盟、美国、日本为代表的发达经济体,设置了针对装备制造业的技术性贸易壁垒,作为中国主要的贸易伙伴,不可逾越的技术性贸易壁垒体系严重制约着我国对外贸易的发展。作为全球四大经济体,中、欧、美、日任何一方的贸易措施都会对全球贸易发展产生举足轻重的影响,彼此之间博弈的激烈程度不言而喻。同时,进口国企业唆使政府设置技术性贸易壁垒与出口国企业进行技术创新的博弈,很大程度上影响着技术性贸易壁垒的实施以及大国之间的政治博弈。鉴于此,本文主要遵循动态演化博弈模型的思想,分析欧、美、日与中国在装备制造业领域的技术性贸易壁垒博弈,进而为我国装备制造业企业克服国外复杂的技术性贸易壁垒体系提供一些建议。文章共分为五个部分：第一部分绪论,包括选题背景与研究意义、文献综述、结构安排以及创新点和不足之处。综述已有的研究成果,可以发现国内外学者分别从技术标准、技术性贸易壁垒与技术创新三个角度进行了十分详尽的研究,但对于技术标准、技术性贸易壁垒与技术创新三者之间相互影响的动态关系的研究则比较滞后。第二部分分析进口国技术性贸易壁垒与出口国技术创新间的动态演化关系。从表面上看,技术标准的提高会促进技术性贸易壁垒的形成,而技术性贸易壁垒又会促使出口企业进行技术创新,但实际三者之间的动态关系远不止这么简单,该部分运用动态演化博弈模型,着重分析进口国企业唆使政府制定技术性贸易壁垒与出口国装备制造业企业技术创新之间的动态博弈过程,并寻找演化博弈的稳态均衡点。第三部分分析我国装备制造业出口的技术性贸易壁垒。从我国装备制造业面临的技术性贸易壁垒角度,通过机电行业和通信设备行业遭受的技术性贸易壁垒展示技术性贸易壁垒发展的动态性、复杂性、政治性。从技术性贸易壁垒与技术创新之间的实证分析角度,选取欧盟、美国、日本为分析对象,通过分析进口国设置技术性贸易壁垒与出口国企业技术创新之间的相关性,寻找二者动态演化博弈的轨迹以及稳态均衡点。第四部分从一般性和特殊性的角度分析我国装备制造业应对技术性贸易壁垒的创新策略。从一般性角度来说,政府、行业协会和企业应充分合作,建立全面的技术性贸易壁垒应对的创新机制,确保经济安全,进而维护国家政治安全；从特殊性角度来说,针对性地应对欧、美、日等目标市场,严格按照动态演化博弈轨迹选择相应的技术创新强度和市场转移策略。第五部分结论,梳理文章的整体思路,总结全文的主要观点。
[Abstract]:In the course of the development of international trade, the developing countries and the developed countries are always in the unequal position. The trade policy based on their own interests is always the vane of the change of international trade policy. In the twenty-first Century, the trade protectionism not only did not withdraw from the international trade under the background of the global trade liberalization. The stage, however, exists in a more flexible and more subtle form -- technical barriers to trade.
Technical barriers to trade mainly include technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures, showing the characteristics of concealment, rationality, flexibility, dynamics, linkage, difference and disputability, and become obstacles to free trade in goods and services. The initial technical barriers to trade are more economic purposes, with the continuous application and development of technology. The political purpose of the trade barriers is becoming more and more obvious. Economic security and political security are no longer the two independent security areas. The intersection of the two is in a growing trend. To a large extent, economic security is gradually replacing political security and becoming the main way for developed countries to contain the development of China's home.
As the core of the manufacturing industry, as the core of the development of the national economy, the equipment manufacturing industry is the core area of the national economic security. It is becoming a new field for the developed countries to intervene in the development of the developing countries. The developed economies, represented by the EU, the United States and Japan, have set up technical barriers to trade in the manufacturing industry as the main China. Trade partners, insuperable technical barriers to trade barriers seriously restrict the development of China's foreign trade. As the four largest economy in the world, the trade measures of China, Europe, the United States and Japan will have a decisive influence on the development of Global trade. The intensity of the game between each other is self-evident. At the same time, the importing enterprises abet The game between the technical barriers to trade and the technological innovation of the exporters has a great influence on the implementation of the technical barriers to trade and the political game between the big countries. In view of this, this paper mainly follows the idea of dynamic evolutionary game model, and analyzes the technical trade of Europe, the United States, Japan and China in the field of equipment manufacturing. The barrier game provides some suggestions for China's equipment manufacturing enterprises to overcome the complicated technical barriers to trade in foreign countries.
The article is divided into five parts:
The first part is the introduction, including the background and significance of the topic, the literature review, the structure arrangement and the innovation points and inadequacies. A summary of the existing research results can be found that the scholars at home and abroad have studied the technical standards, technical trade barriers and technological innovation in three angles, but for technical standards and technical trade. The research on the dynamic relationship between the three barriers and technological innovation is lagging behind.
The second part analyzes the dynamic relationship between the technical barriers to trade and the technological innovation of the exporting countries. On the surface, the improvement of technical standards will promote the formation of technical barriers to trade, and the technical barriers to trade will encourage the export enterprises to carry out technological innovation, but the dynamic relationship between the three parties is far more than that simple. In this part, the dynamic evolutionary game model is used to analyze the dynamic game between the instigated government of the importing country and the technological innovation of the exporting country's equipment manufacturing enterprise, and to find the steady equilibrium point of the evolutionary game.
The third part analyzes the technical barriers to trade in the export of the equipment manufacturing industry in China. From the technical barriers to trade in the equipment manufacturing industry in China, the technical barriers to trade in the mechanical and electrical industry and the communication equipment industry show the dynamic, complex and political nature of the development of technical barriers to trade, from technical trade barriers and technology. In the empirical analysis of innovation, we choose the EU, the United States and Japan as the analysis object. Through the analysis of the correlation between the import countries' technical barriers to trade and the technological innovation of the exporters, we find the trajectory of the two dynamic evolutionary game and the steady equilibrium point.
The fourth part analyzes the innovation strategy of China's equipment manufacturing industry to deal with technical barriers to trade from the perspective of general and special. From a general point of view, the government, industry associations and enterprises should cooperate fully to establish an innovative mechanism to deal with the technical barriers to trade, to ensure economic security and to safeguard national political security; In the special point of view, we should deal with the target markets of Europe, America and Japan, and select the corresponding technological innovation intensity and market transfer strategy according to the dynamic evolutionary game trajectory.
The fifth part of the conclusion, combing the overall thinking of the article, summarizes the main points of the full text.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.4;F752.02

【参考文献】