支付让渡权、可信威胁与技术转让竞合格局
发布时间：2018-08-07 19:44
【摘要】：中国大量企业借助技术转让推进技术创新,理清技术转让谈判要素对技术转让竞合格局的影响,研究技术转让交互策略显得尤为重要。梳理已有研究,构建纳什谈判博弈模型,基于平等主义和功利主义测度局中人支付值;引入支付让渡权和可信威胁假设,基于最小化最大值理论和差分博弈求得两种新解;基于中国奇瑞汽车公司的实际数据,验证3种均衡解的存在性,探讨其差异性根源。研究结果表明,纳什谈判博弈均衡解是功利主义原则和平等主义原则的折衷;对于引进方而言,支付让渡权及可信威胁条件下的新均衡解都优于一般均衡解,而且支付让渡权相对于可信威胁对引进方更有利;3种均衡解的差异性源于3种基础性均衡理论,3种基础性均衡理论分别适用于不同的技术转让谈判情境,并产生竞合格局的差别。研究结论有助于设计技术转让攻防策略和可信威胁,强化技术转让竞合格局,提高技术转让绩效,推动引进方技术进步。
[Abstract]:With the help of technology transfer, a large number of Chinese enterprises promote technological innovation and clarify the influence of technology transfer negotiation elements on the pattern of technology transfer competition and cooperation, so it is particularly important to study the interactive strategy of technology transfer. Combing the existing research, constructing Nash negotiation game model, based on egalitarian and utilitarian measurement of human payment value, introducing payment transfer right and credible threat hypothesis, based on minimization maximum theory and difference game to find two new solutions; Based on the actual data of China Chery Automobile Company, the existence of the three equilibrium solutions is verified and the root causes of their differences are discussed. The results show that the equilibrium solution of Nash negotiation game is a compromise between utilitarianism principle and egalitarian principle, for the importer, the new equilibrium solution under the condition of payment transfer right and credible threat is superior to the general equilibrium solution. Moreover, the difference of the three equilibrium solutions of the right to pay transfer is more favorable to the importer than the credible threat. The difference between the three basic equilibrium theories and the three basic equilibrium theories respectively applies to different negotiation situations of technology transfer. And produce the difference of competing pattern. The conclusion is helpful to design the strategy and credible threat of technology transfer, strengthen the competing pattern of technology transfer, improve the performance of technology transfer, and promote the technological progress of the importing party.
【作者单位】： 西北工业大学管理学院;西安邮电大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71173172,71102149) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJC790084) 陕西省教育厅人文社科专项资助项目(12JK0056)~~
【分类号】：F426.471;F273.1
，
本文编号：2171154
[Abstract]:With the help of technology transfer, a large number of Chinese enterprises promote technological innovation and clarify the influence of technology transfer negotiation elements on the pattern of technology transfer competition and cooperation, so it is particularly important to study the interactive strategy of technology transfer. Combing the existing research, constructing Nash negotiation game model, based on egalitarian and utilitarian measurement of human payment value, introducing payment transfer right and credible threat hypothesis, based on minimization maximum theory and difference game to find two new solutions; Based on the actual data of China Chery Automobile Company, the existence of the three equilibrium solutions is verified and the root causes of their differences are discussed. The results show that the equilibrium solution of Nash negotiation game is a compromise between utilitarianism principle and egalitarian principle, for the importer, the new equilibrium solution under the condition of payment transfer right and credible threat is superior to the general equilibrium solution. Moreover, the difference of the three equilibrium solutions of the right to pay transfer is more favorable to the importer than the credible threat. The difference between the three basic equilibrium theories and the three basic equilibrium theories respectively applies to different negotiation situations of technology transfer. And produce the difference of competing pattern. The conclusion is helpful to design the strategy and credible threat of technology transfer, strengthen the competing pattern of technology transfer, improve the performance of technology transfer, and promote the technological progress of the importing party.
【作者单位】： 西北工业大学管理学院;西安邮电大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71173172,71102149) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJC790084) 陕西省教育厅人文社科专项资助项目(12JK0056)~~
【分类号】：F426.471;F273.1
，
本文编号：2171154
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