基于动态演化博弈的生态工业链稳定性研究
发布时间：2018-10-15 16:37
【摘要】：生态工业链的稳定性是检验生态工业园建设的一项重要内容,随着社会经济的发展人们对生态问题越来越关注,生态工业园在国内外已经得到广泛实践,而生态工业园的建设成效状况和运行情况却不容乐观。本文以生态工业链稳定性为研究对象,试图运用演化博弈理论分别对双方合作的单链稳定性和多方合作的多链稳定性展开研究。 利用演化博弈理论,建立单链条件下企业双方合作的违约博弈模型,并对其进行数值模拟分析。在数量生态学中的复制动态模型上,考虑政府补贴对废弃物再利用的影响,建立单链条件下的改进违约博弈模型,并对企业双方博弈过程进行分析计算。结果表明,该博弈过程有惟一的演化均衡点即上游企业和下游企业同时采取合作策略。在演化博弈过程中,政府补贴发挥关键作用：即在特定情形下,政府的补贴必须合理(不能过高也不能过低)才能快速达到演化均衡点。 本文开展了多条生态产业链条件下的企业博弈稳定分析。建立了三个结点、五个链条的复杂产业链模式,在此基础上,定义了企业的博弈规则和收益函数,明确了三个结点企业的64种策略组合。通过编程软件进行数值模拟仿真分析,仿真结果表明,在多条生态产业链条件下,参与生态工业链的企业越多,产业链之间的稳定性越高；企业的投机取巧行为能给企业带来短期效益,但会破坏生态工业链整体的长期稳定性。在数值仿真分析中,通过控制变量法对各参数进行敏感性分析,确定在既定的条件下企业采取何种策略处理副产品。 本文将动态演化博弈理论与多主体仿真理论相结合,并应用于生态工业链接的稳定性分析中,为生态工业园的发展提供了新视角,仿真的结果对生态工业园中的企业行为决策具有一定的指导意义。
[Abstract]:The stability of eco-industrial chain is an important content in the construction of eco-industrial park. With the development of social economy, people pay more and more attention to ecological problems, and eco-industrial park has been widely used at home and abroad. However, the construction effect and operation of eco-industrial park are not optimistic. In this paper, the stability of eco-industrial chain is taken as the research object, and the evolutionary game theory is used to study the single-chain stability of cooperation and the multi-chain stability of multi-party cooperation, respectively. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the default game model of enterprise cooperation under single-chain condition is established, and the numerical simulation is carried out. In the dynamic model of quantity ecology, considering the influence of government subsidy on the reuse of waste, the improved default game model under single chain condition is established, and the game process between enterprise and enterprise is analyzed and calculated. The results show that the game process has a unique evolutionary equilibrium point, that is, upstream firms and downstream firms simultaneously adopt cooperative strategies. In the evolutionary game process, government subsidies play a key role: under certain circumstances, government subsidies must be reasonable (not too high or too low) in order to reach the evolutionary equilibrium point quickly. In this paper, the stability analysis of enterprise game under the condition of multiple ecological industrial chains is carried out. The complex industrial chain model with three nodes and five chains is established. On this basis, the game rules and income function of the enterprise are defined, and 64 kinds of strategy combinations of the three node enterprises are defined. The simulation results show that under the condition of multiple eco-industrial chains, the more enterprises participate in the eco-industrial chains, the higher the stability between the industrial chains. The opportunistic behavior of enterprises can bring short-term benefits to enterprises, but it will destroy the long-term stability of ecological industrial chain. In the numerical simulation analysis, the sensitivity of each parameter is analyzed by the control variable method, and the strategy to deal with the by-product is determined under the given conditions. This paper combines the theory of dynamic evolutionary game with the theory of multi-agent simulation, and applies it to the stability analysis of eco-industrial link, which provides a new perspective for the development of eco-industrial park. The simulation results have certain guiding significance for enterprise behavior decision in EIP.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F403;F224.32
本文编号：2273133
[Abstract]:The stability of eco-industrial chain is an important content in the construction of eco-industrial park. With the development of social economy, people pay more and more attention to ecological problems, and eco-industrial park has been widely used at home and abroad. However, the construction effect and operation of eco-industrial park are not optimistic. In this paper, the stability of eco-industrial chain is taken as the research object, and the evolutionary game theory is used to study the single-chain stability of cooperation and the multi-chain stability of multi-party cooperation, respectively. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the default game model of enterprise cooperation under single-chain condition is established, and the numerical simulation is carried out. In the dynamic model of quantity ecology, considering the influence of government subsidy on the reuse of waste, the improved default game model under single chain condition is established, and the game process between enterprise and enterprise is analyzed and calculated. The results show that the game process has a unique evolutionary equilibrium point, that is, upstream firms and downstream firms simultaneously adopt cooperative strategies. In the evolutionary game process, government subsidies play a key role: under certain circumstances, government subsidies must be reasonable (not too high or too low) in order to reach the evolutionary equilibrium point quickly. In this paper, the stability analysis of enterprise game under the condition of multiple ecological industrial chains is carried out. The complex industrial chain model with three nodes and five chains is established. On this basis, the game rules and income function of the enterprise are defined, and 64 kinds of strategy combinations of the three node enterprises are defined. The simulation results show that under the condition of multiple eco-industrial chains, the more enterprises participate in the eco-industrial chains, the higher the stability between the industrial chains. The opportunistic behavior of enterprises can bring short-term benefits to enterprises, but it will destroy the long-term stability of ecological industrial chain. In the numerical simulation analysis, the sensitivity of each parameter is analyzed by the control variable method, and the strategy to deal with the by-product is determined under the given conditions. This paper combines the theory of dynamic evolutionary game with the theory of multi-agent simulation, and applies it to the stability analysis of eco-industrial link, which provides a new perspective for the development of eco-industrial park. The simulation results have certain guiding significance for enterprise behavior decision in EIP.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F403;F224.32
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