天然气供应链网络均衡定价机制研究
发布时间:2019-01-05 18:24
【摘要】:我国经济持续增长,能源需求旺盛,奠定了天然气消费的基础。同时在改善环境质量与全球碳减排背景下,扩大天然气利用规模以及提高天然气利用比例对我国显得尤为迫切。然而我国落后的天然气工业基础以及不健全的定价制度使得天然气开发利用进程缓慢。现阶段我国天然气定价实行的是政府指导下的成本加成定价方法,天然气价格与其它可替代能源比价不合理,政府定价不能反映天然气的市场价值,天然气价格相对国际市场偏低,从而影响了开发企业的生产积极性。同时天然气产业链上中下游定价的不合理性导致了各方利益分配不均,影响了天然气工业的快速发展。事实表明,我国天然气的定价机制已经不能适应天然气产业的发展要求。 本文从我国天然气定价现状出发,对比了天然气与其替代能源的相对价格,指出了以成本加成法为基础的政府指导定价体制的不足之处,并对即将展开的基于市场净回值法的天然气定价改革做出了解释和展望。随后,本文基于天然气供应链网络的视角,假设各市场主体竞争非合作,逐层分析了各层决策者的行为与目标,构建了包含天然气生产商、零售商与消费者三层主体在内的天然气供应链网络均衡模型,并推导出最终的均衡条件。随后通过一个数值案例,验证了模型的准确性,并进一步探讨了在变更成本、增加生产商数量以及规定价格上限三种不同情景下均衡结果的变化。最后以上海市为例实证分析了市场自由竞争、终端价管制以及净回值法定价三种情景下上海市天然气价格以及配气量的相应变化。 通过分析,本文得出结论:天然气价格上限规制使得天然气价格偏低,导致了天然气需求的膨胀,虽然价格规制能在一定程度改善消费者福利,却使得社会整体福利下降;天然气价格改革的最终目标是放松价格上限规制,使其由市场决定,但是必须在天然气生产环节引入竞争,增加天然气开发企业数量,只有充分竞争才能促使天然气生产企业降低成本,使得社会整体福利增加。
[Abstract]:Our country economy continues to grow, energy demand is exuberant, laid the foundation of natural gas consumption. At the same time, under the background of improving environmental quality and reducing carbon emissions in the world, it is particularly urgent to expand the scale of natural gas utilization and increase the proportion of natural gas utilization in China. However, the backward foundation of natural gas industry and the imperfect pricing system make the development and utilization of natural gas slow. At present, the pricing of natural gas in China is based on the cost-plus pricing method under the guidance of the government. The price of natural gas is unreasonable compared with other alternative energy sources, and the government pricing cannot reflect the market value of natural gas. The price of natural gas is relatively low compared with the international market, thus affecting the production enthusiasm of development enterprises. At the same time, the unreasonable pricing in the middle and lower reaches of the natural gas industry chain leads to the uneven distribution of benefits and affects the rapid development of the natural gas industry. The facts show that the pricing mechanism of natural gas in China can not meet the requirements of the development of natural gas industry. Starting from the current situation of natural gas pricing in China, this paper compares the relative prices of natural gas with its alternative energy sources, and points out the shortcomings of the government-guided pricing system based on the cost addition method. The paper also gives an explanation and prospect of the upcoming natural gas pricing reform based on the market net return method. Then, based on the perspective of the natural gas supply chain network, this paper analyzes the behavior and objectives of the decision-makers in each layer, and constructs a natural gas producer, based on the assumption that the market players are competing and non-cooperative. The equilibrium model of natural gas supply chain network between retailer and consumer is presented, and the final equilibrium condition is deduced. Then, a numerical example is given to verify the accuracy of the model, and the variation of equilibrium results under three different scenarios, namely, changing cost, increasing the number of producers and fixing price upper limit, is further discussed. Finally, taking Shanghai as an example, the paper analyzes the corresponding changes of natural gas price and gas distribution in Shanghai under the three scenarios of free market competition, terminal price regulation and net return value pricing. Through the analysis, this paper draws a conclusion: the price of natural gas is on the low side under the upper limit regulation of natural gas price, which leads to the expansion of natural gas demand, although price regulation can improve the welfare of consumers to some extent, it makes the overall welfare of society decline; The ultimate goal of the natural gas price reform is to relax the price cap regulation and make it decided by the market, but it is necessary to introduce competition in the natural gas production link and increase the number of natural gas development enterprises. Only full competition can promote natural gas production enterprises to reduce costs and increase the overall welfare of society.
【学位授予单位】:中国地质大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F426.22
本文编号:2402136
[Abstract]:Our country economy continues to grow, energy demand is exuberant, laid the foundation of natural gas consumption. At the same time, under the background of improving environmental quality and reducing carbon emissions in the world, it is particularly urgent to expand the scale of natural gas utilization and increase the proportion of natural gas utilization in China. However, the backward foundation of natural gas industry and the imperfect pricing system make the development and utilization of natural gas slow. At present, the pricing of natural gas in China is based on the cost-plus pricing method under the guidance of the government. The price of natural gas is unreasonable compared with other alternative energy sources, and the government pricing cannot reflect the market value of natural gas. The price of natural gas is relatively low compared with the international market, thus affecting the production enthusiasm of development enterprises. At the same time, the unreasonable pricing in the middle and lower reaches of the natural gas industry chain leads to the uneven distribution of benefits and affects the rapid development of the natural gas industry. The facts show that the pricing mechanism of natural gas in China can not meet the requirements of the development of natural gas industry. Starting from the current situation of natural gas pricing in China, this paper compares the relative prices of natural gas with its alternative energy sources, and points out the shortcomings of the government-guided pricing system based on the cost addition method. The paper also gives an explanation and prospect of the upcoming natural gas pricing reform based on the market net return method. Then, based on the perspective of the natural gas supply chain network, this paper analyzes the behavior and objectives of the decision-makers in each layer, and constructs a natural gas producer, based on the assumption that the market players are competing and non-cooperative. The equilibrium model of natural gas supply chain network between retailer and consumer is presented, and the final equilibrium condition is deduced. Then, a numerical example is given to verify the accuracy of the model, and the variation of equilibrium results under three different scenarios, namely, changing cost, increasing the number of producers and fixing price upper limit, is further discussed. Finally, taking Shanghai as an example, the paper analyzes the corresponding changes of natural gas price and gas distribution in Shanghai under the three scenarios of free market competition, terminal price regulation and net return value pricing. Through the analysis, this paper draws a conclusion: the price of natural gas is on the low side under the upper limit regulation of natural gas price, which leads to the expansion of natural gas demand, although price regulation can improve the welfare of consumers to some extent, it makes the overall welfare of society decline; The ultimate goal of the natural gas price reform is to relax the price cap regulation and make it decided by the market, but it is necessary to introduce competition in the natural gas production link and increase the number of natural gas development enterprises. Only full competition can promote natural gas production enterprises to reduce costs and increase the overall welfare of society.
【学位授予单位】:中国地质大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F426.22
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