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我国政府采购寻租问题研究

发布时间:2018-01-23 04:57

  本文关键词: 政府采购 寻租 权利 个人利益 出处:《山东财经大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:寻租理论是二十世纪中期以后国外经济学术界内讨论非常激烈的话题之一,也是现今世界学者们极难以挑战的一个学术领域,寻租活动是普遍存在于以市场经济为主的国家和转轨期国家的一种经济行为及现象。由于当前我国经济和社会正处于一个特殊的时期,因此寻租现象不可避免,尤其是权力寻租更是难以防范。其中,以公共资金进行公共购买的政府采购领域中的寻租行为最为泛滥。 寻租行为是对现存利益再次分配的一种非生产性活动,属于经济活动中的负和博弈,它会扭曲市场机制的正常运行、浪费社会资源以及造成等等之类的后果。如果政府采购中存在寻租行为,不仅会滋生腐败,有损政府的良好形象,还可能导致政府采购质量的下降,甚至引发严重的安全事故。而政府采购作为国家财政支出的一个重要分支,在一个国家社会经济中的地位举足轻重。因此,为了提高公共资金的使用效率、加强政府采购的社会效益及完善政府采购制度,有必要深入剖析政府采购领域寻租行为的发生机制及研究抑制对策。 本文综合了实证性分析方法和规范性研究方法,研究了我国政府采购领域寻租行为的表现形式及产生原因,并提出了具有针对性的防范对策。本文从政府采购寻租的概念入手,对寻租及政府采购的相关概念进行了界定,并阐述了“经济人”假设理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论及博弈理论,为政府采购寻租问题的深入研究做好了铺垫。然后利用博弈模型对政府采购中寻租行为的过程进行了深层次的剖析,接着详细分析了我国政府采购的寻租现状,并通过典型案例对上述分析进行了论证及在此基础上论述了政府采购寻租行为的产生原因,最后结合全文分析,提出来防范我国政府采购寻租行为的基本措施。
[Abstract]:Since the middle of 20th century, rent-seeking theory has been one of the most heated topics in foreign economic and academic circles, and it is also a very difficult academic field for scholars in the world to challenge. The rent-seeking activity is a kind of economic behavior and phenomenon which exists generally in the countries with market economy and transition period. Because our country's economy and society are in a special period at present, rent-seeking phenomenon is inevitable. Especially the power rent-seeking is more difficult to prevent, among which, the rent-seeking behavior is most widespread in the field of public purchase with public funds. Rent-seeking is a kind of non-productive activity which redistributes the existing benefits. It belongs to the negative sum game in the economic activities, and it will distort the normal operation of the market mechanism. If there is rent-seeking behavior in government procurement, it will not only breed corruption, damage the good image of the government, but also lead to the decline of the quality of government procurement. Government procurement, as an important branch of national financial expenditure, plays an important role in the social economy of a country. Therefore, in order to improve the efficiency of the use of public funds. It is necessary to analyze the mechanism of rent-seeking behavior in the field of government procurement and to study the countermeasures to restrain the social benefits of government procurement and to perfect the system of government procurement. This article synthesizes the positive analysis method and the normative research method, has studied our country government procurement domain rent-seeking behavior manifestation and the reason. This paper starts with the concept of rent-seeking in government procurement, defines the related concepts of rent-seeking and government procurement, and expounds the hypothesis of "economic man" and the principal-agent theory. Information asymmetry theory and game theory, for the government procurement rent-seeking problem to do a good job of in-depth research, and then the use of game model in government procurement rent-seeking behavior in-depth analysis. Then it analyzes the rent-seeking situation of our government procurement in detail, and through typical cases to demonstrate the above analysis and on this basis discusses the causes of rent-seeking behavior of government procurement, finally combined with the full text analysis. Put forward to prevent our government procurement rent-seeking behavior of the basic measures.
【学位授予单位】:山东财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F812.45

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