中央政府和地方政府生产性公共支出职责划分的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-02-09 08:22

  本文关键词： 生产性公共支出 中央和地方政府公共支出职责划分 动态面板回归　出处：《上海经济研究》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：该文认为,生产性公共支出与经济增长率存在倒"U"型关系,虽然生产性公共服务有助于提高产出水平,但是当支出过高时,又会引起税率提高,从而对经济增长产生负面影响,因此生产性公共支出存在最优规模。不同经济活动主体以及不同层级的政府有不同的目标及行为模式,并且不同层级的政府在提供公共服务方面又各有利弊,中央政府需要在准确预期这些行为模式及权衡利弊的基础上划分两级政府提供生产性公共服务职责,使其趋近于最优规模。该文基于我国1995-2015年的涵盖31个省份的面板数据进行实证分析后发现我国的生产性公共支出与经济增长率呈负相关关系,这启示我们目前我国过度依赖GDP的官员政绩考核指标强化了地方政府扩大生产性开支的内在动力,使之超越了最优规模,也为进一步划分中央和地方政府的生产性公共服务供给职责提供了借鉴。
[Abstract]:The paper holds that productive public expenditure has an inverted "U" type relationship with economic growth rate. Although productive public services can help to improve the level of output, when the expenditure is too high, it will lead to higher tax rates, which will have a negative impact on economic growth. Therefore, there is an optimal scale of productive public expenditure. Different economic activity entities and different levels of government have different objectives and behavior patterns, and different levels of government have their own advantages and disadvantages in the provision of public services. The central government needs to divide the responsibilities of two levels of government to provide productive public services on the basis of accurately anticipating these patterns of behaviour and weighing the advantages and disadvantages. Based on the panel data of 31 provinces from 1995 to 2015 in China, we find that there is a negative correlation between the productive public expenditure and the economic growth rate. This enlightens us that the official performance assessment index, which is excessively dependent on GDP, has strengthened the internal power of local government to expand productive expenditure, and made it exceed the optimal scale. Also for the further division of central and local government responsibility for the supply of productive public services to provide reference.
【作者单位】： 北京大学中国公共财政研究中心;
【分类号】：F812.45;F224.32
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本文编号：1497499