政府补贴:救急还是救穷——来自亏损类公司样本的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-01 13:19

本文关键词： 政府补贴产权性质救穷行为救急行为　出处：《南开管理评论》2015年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以2001-2013年我国A股非金融类亏损上市公司数据为样本,重点研究政府倾向于补贴亏损较严重的企业(救穷行为)还是亏损较轻的企业(救急行为)及其经济后果,这对政府如何有效利用补贴资源帮助亏损企业实现扭亏为盈,提升巨额政府补贴资源的利用效率具有重要意义。实证检验结果发现:第一,按产权性质划分,政府对国有企业更倾向于救穷行为,而对非国有企业更倾向于救急行为;第二,按地区的政府干预程度划分,位于干预程度较高地区,政府更倾向于对国有企业进行救穷行为,对非国有企业更倾向于进行救急行为,而政府干预程度较低地区的企业,其亏损程度与政府补贴间则无显著性关系;第三,按行业的竞争性程度划分发现,政府更倾向于对垄断性行业中的国有企业进行救穷行为,对竞争性行业中的非国有企业更倾向于进行救急行为。进一步检验发现,对国有企业救穷行为有助于提升补贴价值,而对非国有企业的救急行为有助于提升补贴价值,其他补贴行为均未显著性提升公司价值。以上研究结果有助于我们更加深刻地理解我国政府对企业的补贴机理及其经济后果,从而为政府科学配置补贴资源、进一步提高补贴资源的利用效率提供理论依据。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of A share non-financial loss listed companies in China from 2001 to 2013, this paper focuses on the study of the government's tendency to subsidize the enterprises with serious losses (poor rescue) or those with less losses (emergency rescue) and their economic consequences. This is of great significance to how the government can effectively use subsidy resources to help loss-making enterprises to turn losses into profits, and to improve the utilization efficiency of large amounts of government subsidy resources. The empirical results show that: first, according to the nature of property rights, The government is more inclined to save the poor from the state-owned enterprises than to the non-state-owned enterprises. Secondly, according to the degree of government intervention in the region, the government is more inclined to rescue the poor of the state-owned enterprises in areas with higher degree of intervention. For the non-state-owned enterprises, they tend to carry out emergency behavior, but the loss degree of the enterprises in the lower degree of government intervention has no significant relationship with the government subsidies. Thirdly, according to the competitive degree of the industry, it is found that, The government is more inclined to rescue the poor of the state-owned enterprises in the monopoly industry, and to the non-state-owned enterprises in the competitive industries. But the emergency behavior of non-state-owned enterprises helps to enhance the value of subsidies, while none of the other subsidies significantly increases the value of companies. The above results help us to understand more deeply the mechanism of government subsidies to enterprises and their economic consequences. Therefore, it provides theoretical basis for the government to allocate subsidy resources scientifically and further improve the utilization efficiency of subsidy resources.
【作者单位】：暨南大学管理学院;武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”(N ECT-12-0432) 国家自然科学基金项目(71272228)资助
【分类号】：F279.2;F812.4

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