政治激励与中国政府财政透明度

发布时间：2018-03-05 15:26

本文选题：政治激励　切入点：地方官员　出处：《厦门大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：越来越多的文献关注到了政治激励对于中国经济发展的影响,研究发现,在中国目前市场经济体制还不健全的情况下,政治激励对于促进经济增长起到了显著作用。本文认为,政治激励背后的逻辑不仅可以用来解释官员促进地方经济增长,也适用于解释地方官员在经济发展中的其他行为,比如说,推动政府信息公开。推动政府财政预决算和“三公经费”的公开,是中央政府近年来十分关注的事情。在中央政府和高层领导人的大力倡导和推动下,各学术研究机构观测到不同地方政府的财政透明度却不尽相同。本文通过实证分析发现,地方政府官员在面临不同程度的政治激励时,他们公开本地财政预算信息的动力有着很大的不同。具体来说,在中央政府和高层领导人大力推动政府信息公开的时候,地方政府官员面临的政治激励越大,他们在公开政府财政预算信息这件事情上表现得越积极,从而使得当地政府的财政透明度更高。针对本文的样本来说,对于省委书记而言,担任中央候补委员和中央委员的省委书记所在省份的财政透明度要显著高于中央政治局委员所在省份的财政透明度；对于省长而言,非委员的省长和担任候补委员的省长对于促进财政信息公开比担任中央委员的省长更加积极。另外,我们发现地方政府官员的其他个人背景也会影响到政府财政信息的公开。相对于从外地来就任的官员,那些曾经在本地任职过,从而与本地势力联系紧密的地方官员在态度上倾向于不公开财政预算信息。此外,地方政府官员的年龄也是影响财政透明度的重要因素,年龄越大的官员有着不积极公开财政预算信息的倾向。在对官员任期的研究中我们发现,在位时间更长的官员会更加积极地公开财政信息。官员的受教育程度对于官员选择积极公开信息或者不公开信息没有特别显著的影响。最后,本文的实证研究并没有发现地方的经济发展水平和财政支出结构会显著影响政府财政透明度的证据。
[Abstract]:More and more literatures have paid attention to the influence of political incentive on China's economic development. The study found that political incentive has played a significant role in promoting economic growth under the condition that China's current market economy system is not perfect. The logic behind political incentives can be used not only to explain officials' promotion of local economic growth, but also to explain other actions of local officials in economic development, for example, It is a matter of great concern to the central government in recent years to promote the disclosure of government information and the disclosure of the government's budget and the "three public funds." under the vigorous advocacy and promotion of the central government and senior leaders, The financial transparency of different local governments is different from that observed by academic research institutions. The empirical analysis shows that local government officials are faced with different levels of political incentives. Their motivation to disclose local budget information is very different. Specifically, when the central government and senior leaders vigorously promote the disclosure of government information, local government officials face greater political incentives. The more active they are in publicizing government budget information, the more transparent the local government will be. For the sample in this article, for the party secretary of the province, The financial transparency of the provinces where the provincial party committee secretaries serve as alternate members of the central committee and members of the central committee are significantly higher than those of the provinces where the members of the political Bureau of the Central Committee are located; as far as governors are concerned, Non-committee governors and alternate governors are more active in promoting the disclosure of financial information than in central governors. In addition, we found that other personal backgrounds of local government officials also affected the disclosure of government financial information. As a result, local officials with close ties to local forces tend not to disclose budgetary information in their attitudes. In addition, the age of local government officials is also an important factor affecting financial transparency. Older officials tend not to actively disclose budgetary information. In a study of the tenure of officials, we found that. Officials who have been in office for a longer period of time will be more active in making public financial information. The official's educational level has not had a particularly significant impact on the official's choice of whether to actively disclose information or not to disclose it. Finally, The empirical study of this paper does not find evidence that the level of local economic development and the structure of fiscal expenditure will significantly affect the transparency of government finances.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D630;F812.2

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