政府采购中企业合谋行为分析——基于拓展的Tullock集体寻租博弈视角

发布时间：2018-03-08 21:16

本文选题：政府采购　切入点：企业合谋　出处：《西北师大学报(社会科学版)》2015年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：政府采购制度是我国财政领域和公共品提供机制上的一次重大制度创新,使其在强化政府宏观调控能力、增强财政监督职能和节约财政支出等方面起到了积极作用。但是,由于制度设计的"漏洞",政府采购领域存在着寻租现象,其中一种寻租的类型是企业合谋竞租。利用拓展的Tullock集体寻租博弈模型,对政府采购过程中参与要素的建模及对模型的解构分析,发现:其一,政府采购中企业合谋竞标是企业在目前竞标情景下,基于自身利益做出的理性选择。联盟形成后,联盟规模与联盟内部规则中平均主义要素比例和整个政府采购中参与竞标的经销商数量呈负相关关系。其二,从整个社会的角度来看,企业的合谋行为悄无声息地规避了政府采购中竞争性制度设计,在我们无法彻底将寻租活动从政府采购中消灭的时候,直接针对这种合谋行为的规制是降低政府采购活动给社会带来无谓损失的有效手段。
[Abstract]:The government procurement system is a major institutional innovation in the financial field and public goods supply mechanism in China, which has played a positive role in strengthening the government's macro-control ability, strengthening the financial supervision function and saving financial expenditure. Because of the "loophole" in the system design, there is rent-seeking phenomenon in the field of government procurement, one of the types of rent-seeking is collusive rent-seeking by enterprises. Using the extended Tullock collective rent-seeking game model, By modeling and deconstructing the participating elements in the process of government procurement, it is found that: first, the collusion bidding of enterprises in government procurement is the rational choice made by enterprises based on their own interests in the current bidding scenario. After the formation of the alliance, The scale of the alliance is negatively related to the proportion of egalitarian elements in the internal rules of the alliance and the number of dealers participating in the bidding in the whole government procurement. Second, from the perspective of the whole society, The collusive behavior of enterprises stealthily circumvented the design of competitive system in government procurement, and when we could not completely eliminate rent-seeking activities from government procurement, The regulation of this kind of collusion is an effective means to reduce the unnecessary loss caused by government procurement.
【作者单位】：兰州大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目“政府职能转变背景下绩效管理研究”(71433005);国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于公共价值的政府绩效结构、生成机制及中国情景下的实证研究”(71373107)
【分类号】：F812.45

【共引文献】