威慑风险与面向高收入个人的税收执法策略

发布时间：2018-03-13 12:21

本文选题：威慑风险　切入点：高收入个人　出处：《南京财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：当前我国高收入者“为富不税”的问题非常突出,如何对其进行有效规制已成为税收执法工作急需解决的难题。本文通过问卷调查和模拟实验对威慑风险下高收入者的纳税遵从决策进行了分析,并在此基础上对面向高收入个人最优税收执法策略的实现路径进行了探索。首先,本文运用博弈论等相关方法,对威慑风险与纳税遵从决策之间的关系进行了研究,论证了查获概率和处罚率与纳税遵从之间的正相关性以及二者之间的替代性；借鉴微观经济学中均衡分析、边际分析等方法,论证了最优税收执法策略的实现路径,即在威慑执法的基础上引入对纳税人的正面激励措施,实施奖惩结合的“胡萝卜加大棒”政策。其次,本文通过问卷调查分析,对可能会影响高收入者纳税遵从的征管因素(查获概率、处罚率、诚信激励、纳税服务)进行了对比性的检验,检验结果表明,在各因素中,查获概率和诚信激励对高收入者纳税遵从决策有着较高的关联性。最后,本文进一步通过模拟实验,比较了高收入者与中低收入者在不同税收执法策略下的纳税遵从决策。对实验结果的分析表明：在各税收执法因素中,查获概率对高收入者纳税遵从度的影响最为显著,而处罚率的影响并不显著；在各税收执法策略组合中,威慑与激励并行的执法策略效果虽不及高查获概率下的,但从成本-收益原则考虑,却要优于其它无激励机制的策略组合。综合理论与实证的分析,本文认为当前我国面向高收入个人税收执法策略的选择,就是要使税务机关在有限执法资源的约束下,通过合理运用查获概率、处罚率、诚信激励、纳税服务等威慑和激励手段,从而最大程度地促进纳税人对税收法律法规的遵从。若想实现高收入者高水平的纳税遵从,税务机关不仅要提高查获概率对其进行执法威慑,而且要营造良好的纳税氛围,通过施行优质的奖励措施对其进行正面激励。这种强制与激励并行的策略选择,将带来更加和谐的征纳关系。结合目前我国税收执法机制中存在的一些问题,本文认为应当从提高税收查获概率、优化税收处罚制度、重塑纳税激励机制等方面着手,对税收征管工作进行改进和完善,从而实现上述目标。
[Abstract]:At present, the problem of "being rich or not taxing" among the high income earners in our country is very prominent. How to regulate it effectively has become an urgent problem in tax enforcement. This paper analyzes the tax compliance decision of high income earners under the threat of deterrence by means of questionnaire survey and simulation experiment. On this basis, the realization path of the optimal tax enforcement strategy for high-income individuals is explored. Firstly, the relationship between deterrence risk and tax compliance decision is studied by using game theory and other relevant methods. This paper demonstrates the positive correlation between the probability of seizure, the rate of punishment and tax compliance, and the substitution between them, and demonstrates the way to realize the optimal tax enforcement strategy by using the methods of equilibrium analysis and marginal analysis in microeconomics. That is, on the basis of deterrent law enforcement, the introduction of positive incentives to taxpayers, the implementation of the combination of rewards and punishments "carrot and stick" policy. Secondly, this paper through questionnaire analysis, A comparative test was conducted on the factors (detection probability, penalty rate, good faith incentive, tax service) that might affect the tax compliance of high income earners. The results showed that, among the factors, The probabilities of seizure and the incentive of honesty have a high correlation to the decision of tax compliance of high income earners. Finally, through the simulation experiment, This paper compares the decision of tax compliance between the high income group and the middle and low income group under different tax enforcement strategies. The analysis of the experimental results shows that the detection probability has the most significant influence on the tax compliance of the high income group. However, the effect of penalty rate is not significant. In each combination of tax enforcement strategies, the effect of deterrence and incentive parallel law enforcement strategy is not as good as that of high probability of seizure, but it is considered from the cost-benefit principle. However, it is better than other unmotivated strategy combinations. Based on the analysis of theory and practice, this paper argues that the choice of tax enforcement strategy for high-income individuals is to make tax authorities under the constraint of limited law enforcement resources. Through reasonable use of deterrence and incentive means such as probability of seizure, penalty rate, honesty incentive, tax service and so on, taxpayers' compliance with tax laws and regulations can be promoted to the greatest extent. If we want to achieve high level of tax compliance by high income earners, Tax authorities should not only increase the probability of seizure to deter them from enforcing the law, but also create a good tax atmosphere and give them positive incentives through the implementation of high-quality incentives. Combining with some problems existing in the current tax enforcement mechanism of our country, this paper holds that we should start from the aspects of raising the probability of tax seizure, optimizing the tax punishment system, reshaping the tax incentive mechanism, and so on. Tax collection and management work to improve and improve, so as to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.42

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