管理层权力调节下政府补助与高管薪酬粘性关系的研究

发布时间：2018-03-23 22:20

本文选题：政府补助　切入点：高管薪酬　出处：《哈尔滨工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：近些年来,上市公司高管获取“天价薪酬”的现象屡屡被曝光,引起广泛关注。最优薪酬契约论认为,高管薪酬的高低是和企业业绩挂钩,而且成正相关关系,所以可以有效激励高管为公司创造价值。然而“穷庙富和尚”的现象却已经屡见不鲜,甚至企业业绩下降高管薪酬仍然上升。众多学者研究表明,由于内外部监管的缺失,高管很容易影响薪酬的制订,攫取租金。早在2008年,国外学者研究表明高管薪酬存在粘性,即高管薪酬在企业业绩上升时的边际增长量要大于业绩下降时的边际减少量。改革开放后,我国建立了中国特色社会主义市场经济体制,政府与市场之间的关系越来越紧密。政府往往通过政府补贴和相关政策干预企业运行。政府补助的规模庞大,甚者导致企业扭亏为盈。政府的资金补贴给企业业绩很大的帮助。2016年,蓝思科技股份有限公司第一季度财务数据显示,除去非经常性损益这一项目后归属于母公司净利润,公司亏损竟然达到了7400万元,这个被扣除的“非经常性损益”项,最大的一笔为政府补助,总计为2.46亿元。计入损益的政府补助作为影响企业业绩的一个噪音,与经理人的自身努力无关,却很可能在企业业绩下降时,被管理层操控,以增加自身利益。本文首先回顾了国内外关于政府补助和高管薪酬理论的相关文献,重点将研究放在政府补助和薪酬粘性的关系上;其次,在分析政府补助与薪酬的关系时提出假设;运用描述性统计和回归分析的方法,选取了2011年至2015年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验了高管薪酬与政府补助的相关性是否会受到企业业绩调节的影响以及高管薪酬粘性和政府补助之间的关系。实证结果显示:(1)公司业绩下降时,高管薪酬与政府补助的相关关系更加显著;(2)政府补助与公司高管薪酬粘性正相关;(3)管理层权力可以调节政府补助和高管薪酬粘性之间的关系。政府补助是与经理人自身努力无关且影响企业利润的一个噪音,尤其是在企业业绩下降时,管理层为了维持收益的稳定,更有可能操纵政府补助,由此加大上市公司高管薪酬的粘性特征;同时管理层拥有企业的经营权和部分事务的决策权,政府和薪酬粘性的关系受管理层权力大小的调节。通过结果分析,本文提出试图解决公司高管薪酬粘性和规范政府补助使用的建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, executives of listed companies to obtain "salary" phenomenon has been exposed, causing widespread concern. The optimal compensation contract theory, the level of executive compensation is linked to corporate performance, and positive correlation, so it can encourage executives to create value for the company. However, the "poor rich Temple monks" phenomenon is already It is often seen., even the decline in business performance of executive compensation still rise. Many scholars show that due to the lack of internal and external supervision, it is easy to affect the formulation of executive compensation, the rent. As early as 2008, foreign scholars research shows that the existence of executive compensation viscous, namely the marginal growth of executive pay rise in the amount of enterprise performance to reduce the amount of more than marginal decline in performance when. After the reform and opening up, China has established China characteristics of socialist market economy system, the relationship between the government and the market increasingly close political. The government often through government subsidies and related policy intervention in the operation of enterprise. The scale of government subsidies, what causes the enterprise profitability. Government subsidies to the enterprise performance is of great help for.2016 years, LAN Si Polytron Technologies Inc first quarter financial data, excluding non recurring gains and losses of the project after the net profit attributable to the parent company. The loss has reached 74 million yuan, the deduction of non recurring gains and losses, the largest sum of government grants, amounting to 246 million yuan. The government subsidies included in the profit and loss as a noise impact on business performance, and managers of their own efforts but not is likely to decline in corporate performance, is management control, in order to increase their interests. This paper reviews the related literature on government subsidies and compensation theory at home and abroad, will focus on research on government subsidies and compensation Viscous relations; secondly, in the analysis of the relationship between government subsidies and compensation of the proposed hypothesis; using the method of descriptive statistics and regression analysis, from 2011 to 2015 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listed companies as a sample, to test whether the correlation between executive compensation and government subsidies will be subject to influence the relationship between corporate performance and executive compensation regulation viscous and government subsidies. The empirical results show that: (1) the performance of the company declined, correlation between executive compensation and government subsidies are more significant; (2) the government grants and executive compensation viscous positive correlation; (3) the management authority can regulate the relationship between government subsidies and executive compensation. The government subsidy is a viscous a noise and the manager's own efforts is irrelevant and the impact of corporate profits, especially the decline in corporate performance management, in order to maintain the stability of income, are more likely to be manipulated by government subsidies. This increases the viscous characteristics of executive compensation of listed companies; at the same time the enterprise management has the right to operate and part of the business decision-making power, the relationship between the government and the compensation stickiness is regulated by the size of the power management. Through the analysis of the results presented in this paper, trying to solve the government grants the use of the proposed company executive compensation viscous and norms.

【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F812.45

【参考文献】