传统国家治理逻辑下中央与地方政府间的税收关系

发布时间：2018-03-25 08:35

本文选题：国家治理　切入点：制度逻辑　出处：《财政监督》2016年22期

【摘要】：审视中央与地方税收关系演变的历史,可以发现中国传统财政体制运行遵循的政治逻辑,以并税式改革和提高中央分成比例为特点的中央财政集权其实是稳固税收收入、维护特权和防范地方等政治思维导向下的副产品。而基于不同政治考量所设定的制度之间难以避免的相互掣肘和交互作用,使国家财政治理陷入困境:结果失衡与初衷制衡相背离,税权治理制集中与征管权限分散的两难,财政税收在实际操作、实践层面与制度设计层面相背离,税制缺乏弹性与财政支出规模不断扩张相背离。在当代中国处理政府间税收关系问题时,要合理分权,推动税收制度法治化以适应国家治理现代化的需要。
[Abstract]:By examining the history of the evolution of the relationship between central and local taxation, we can find that the political logic followed in the operation of China's traditional financial system is that the centralization of central finance, characterized by a combination of tax reform and raising the proportion of the central government's share, is actually a solid tax revenue. Maintaining privileges and guarding against by-products of downward political thinking, such as local ones, and the inevitable mutual constraints and interactions between systems based on different political considerations, It makes the national financial governance fall into a dilemma: the imbalance of the result deviates from the original intention of checks and balances, the dilemma between the centralization of tax power governance system and the decentralization of the authority to collect and manage, the financial and tax revenue deviates from the system design in the practical operation, the practical level and the system design level. The lack of flexibility of tax system deviates from the expanding scale of fiscal expenditure. When dealing with the problem of intergovernmental tax relations in contemporary China, it is necessary to reasonably decentralize the tax system and to promote the legalization of the tax system to meet the needs of the modernization of national governance.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学财税学院;
【分类号】：F812.42

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