地方财政分权、劳动力选择性转移与农村基础教育投入

发布时间：2018-04-04 22:10

本文选题：地方财政分权　切入点：选择性转移　出处：《贵州财经大学学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：在现行教育体制下,县(市)级政府承担着农村基础教育发展的主要责任,省以下财政分权对地方农村基础教育投入有重要影响;而农村劳动力跨区域的选择性转移使得地方政府的农村基础教育投入具有强烈的外部性。运用2007年—2013年河南省108个县(市)样本的面板数据,通过建立控制了地区效应和时间效应的双向随机效应模型实证检验地方财政分权、农村劳动力选择性转移对县(市)级政府农村基础教育支出的影响。研究发现,省以下财政分权显著减少了地方政府农村基础教育支出,与此同时,农村劳动力转出规模越大,县(市)级政府基础教育支出越低。
[Abstract]:Under the current education system, the county (city) level government bears the main responsibility of the rural basic education development, and the fiscal decentralization below the province has an important influence on the local rural basic education investment.The selective transfer of rural labor force across regions makes the rural basic education input of local government have strong externality.Using the panel data of 108 counties (cities) in Henan Province from 2007 to 2013, this paper empirically tests the decentralization of local finance by establishing a two-way stochastic effect model which controls the regional effect and the time effect.The influence of selective transfer of rural labor force on rural basic education expenditure of county (city) government.The study found that fiscal decentralization under provincial level significantly reduced the expenditure on basic education in rural areas of local governments. At the same time, the larger the scale of rural labor force transfer, the lower the basic education expenditure of county (city) governments.
【作者单位】：河南农业大学农业政策与农村发展研究中心;
【基金】：河南省高等学校哲学社会科学应用研究重大项目(2017-YYZD-02) 河南省教育厅人文社科研究项目(2017-ZZJH-234) 中国博士后基金(2013M541978)
【分类号】：F249.27;F812.7;G521

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