新型城镇化背景下城市房屋征收补偿的演化博弈模型

发布时间：2018-04-13 09:50

本文选题：城市房屋征收补偿 + 演化博弈　；参考：《财经理论与实践》2017年04期

【摘要】：城市房屋征收补偿的研究,均建立在完全理性、最优策略等传统的博弈理论基础之上,现实当中由于征收人(政府)与被征收人都是有限理性的,因此传统研究不符合城市房屋征收过程中的实际情况,更不利于城市房屋征收补偿机制的优化及改善。为了使城市房屋征收补偿问题更趋于公平和更贴合实际,本文运用演化博弈的思维,分析有限理性约束和初始条件约束下的演化稳定策略均衡,基于城市房屋征收补偿这个长期反复的博弈过程,研究博弈双方(征收人与被征收人)的策略调整、趋势以及局部稳定性。为了使得征收人(政府)与被征收人实现利益均衡,提出了改变和增加城市房屋征收补偿方式等建议。
[Abstract]:The research of urban housing expropriation compensation is based on the traditional game theory such as complete rationality and optimal strategy. In reality, both the expropriator (government) and the expropriated person are bounded rational.Therefore, the traditional research does not accord with the actual situation in the process of urban housing collection, and it is also not conducive to the optimization and improvement of the compensation mechanism of urban housing collection.In order to make the problem of urban housing levy and compensation more equitable and more practical, this paper uses the thinking of evolutionary game to analyze the equilibrium of evolutionary stability strategy under the constraints of finite rationality and initial conditions.Based on the long-repeated game process of urban house expropriation and compensation, this paper studies the strategy adjustment, trend and local stability of both sides of the game (expropriator and expropriated person).In order to balance the interests of the expropriator (government) and the expropriated person, the author puts forward some suggestions such as changing and increasing the compensation method of urban house levy.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;湖南财政经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71671187) 湖南省教育厅科学研究项目(16B044)
【分类号】：F224.32;F812.45

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