地区间竞争、财政分权与环境污染

发布时间：2018-04-16 02:25

本文选题：地方竞争 + 环境污染　；参考：《厦门大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,我国环境污染日益严重,给我国的经济和社会发展带来了威胁,而我国的环境问题恶化的原因之一是我国特有的“中国式财政分权”下的政府行为。中国式财政分权是一种政治集权体制下的政府委任制基础上的财政分权,在以GDP为主要内容的相对绩效考核机制下,地方政府为了晋升展开了GDP竞赛,为了超过竞争省份,地方政府之间往往会采取策略性的环境收支政策。一方面,地方政府降低排污费,牺牲环境来换取经济增长。另一方面,地方政府减少环境支出。财政分权通过地方政府的策略性环境政策加剧了环境污染。目前来看,国外对于地方竞争和财政分权对污染的影响的研究成果已经相当丰富,但是国外的文献基本上都是针对财政联邦制度下有独立开征税收权利的地方政府的竞争行为进行研究,探讨财政分权对环境污染的问题。而我国地方政府并不能独立开征税收和决定税率,此外,我国独特的财政分权体制是政治集权和经济分权的合体,这些差异导致国外的一些研究对我国环境治理问题的参考意义有限。而国内对于财政分权下,地方政府在财政政策上的竞争的文献也很丰富,但是研究地方政府环境收支政策的竞争还比较少,所以本文借鉴了国外的研究,在国内研究地方财政政策竞争的框架的基础上,把我国地方政府的环境政策细分为排污费政策和环境支出政策,运用实证方法,研究了地方政府在这两个环境政策的博弈,最后本文还利用交叉项研究了财政分权通过地方政府的环境政策对环境污染的影响,更加证实了财政分权下的地方政府行为对于环境污染的不利影响,并对我国的环境治理问题提出改革建议。本文共五章,第一章为导论,介绍了本文的研究背景、研究意义、国内外研究现状等。第二章简要介绍了财政分权的基本理论,包括中国式分权的概念、特性。然后在此基础上介绍了中国式分权下的地方政府在环境政策方面的竞争行为,包括地方政府的策略性环境政策的种类、方式、结果。第三章以省级面板数据为对象从实证的角度研究了地方政府在环境收支政策方面的博弈行为。第四章以省级面板数据为对象,用系统GMM方法从实证的角度研究了财政分权通过地方政府的环境收支政策对于环境污染的影响,第五章为政策建议,根据前面的分析得出结论,并提出深化财政分权改革,构建新的政绩考核机制等建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, environmental pollution in China is becoming more and more serious, which threatens the economic and social development of our country. One of the reasons for the deterioration of environmental problems in China is the government behavior under the "Chinese fiscal decentralization".Chinese fiscal decentralization is a kind of fiscal decentralization based on the government appointment system under the political centralization system. Under the relative performance appraisal mechanism with GDP as the main content, the local governments have launched the GDP competition for promotion, in order to surpass the competitive provinces.Local governments tend to adopt strategic environmental policies.On the one hand, local governments cut sewage charges at the expense of the environment in exchange for economic growth.On the other hand, local governments reduce environmental spending.Fiscal decentralization intensifies environmental pollution through the strategic environmental policy of local governments.At present, foreign research on the impact of local competition and fiscal decentralization on pollution has been quite abundant.However, the foreign literature is mainly focused on the competition behavior of the local government which has the right to levy tax independently under the fiscal federal system, and probes into the problem of the fiscal decentralization to the environment pollution.However, local governments in China cannot independently levy taxes and determine tax rates. In addition, China's unique fiscal decentralization system is a combination of political centralization and economic decentralization.These differences lead to the limited reference significance of some foreign studies on environmental governance in China.However, the domestic literature on competition between local governments on fiscal policy is also very rich, but there are few studies on the competition of local governments' environmental revenue and expenditure policies, so this paper draws lessons from foreign research.On the basis of domestic research on the framework of local fiscal policy competition, the environmental policy of local government in China is subdivided into sewage charge policy and environmental expenditure policy, and the game between these two environmental policies is studied by using the empirical method.Finally, this paper studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution through local government's environmental policy, and further proves the adverse effect of local government's behavior on environmental pollution under fiscal decentralization.And put forward the reform suggestion to our country's environmental governance problem.This paper consists of five chapters, the first chapter is the introduction, which introduces the research background, research significance, domestic and foreign research status.The second chapter briefly introduces the basic theory of fiscal decentralization, including the concept and characteristics of Chinese decentralization.Then it introduces the competition behavior of the local government in the environmental policy, including the type, mode and result of the strategic environmental policy of the local government.The third chapter studies the game behavior of the local government in environmental revenue and expenditure policy from the perspective of empirical analysis based on provincial panel data.The fourth chapter takes the provincial panel data as the object, uses the system GMM method from the empirical angle to study the fiscal decentralization through the local government environmental revenue and expenditure policy to the environmental pollution influence, the fifth chapter is the policy proposal, according to the preceding analysis draws the conclusion,It also puts forward some suggestions such as deepening the reform of fiscal decentralization and constructing a new performance assessment mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：X321;F812.2

【相似文献】