财政分权、政府规模扩张与官员腐败——基于中国省际动态面板数据的研究

发布时间：2018-04-29 01:13

本文选题：财政分权 + 政府规模　；参考：《上海经济研究》2015年01期

【摘要】：财政分权带来的晋升激励和地方政府强化本地资源汲取能力所引发的政府规模扩张是中国式官僚腐败频发的制度性原因。该文利用动态面板差分广义距估计与系统广义距估计方法对我国1998至2010年省际分权、政府规模膨胀与官僚腐败之间的相互关系所进行的研究发现:随着地方政府收入型分权与自主型分权的渐进式增长,分权引发的晋升锦标赛通过强化财政竞争行为助长了地方官员腐败。分权不仅未能抑制政府规模膨胀,反而因地方政府的地区垄断性增强还进一步导致了官员腐败的累积。同时,中国式官僚腐败具有明显的"棘轮效应"倾向。当前实施的城镇化战略与服务型政府转型在初期无助于减缓腐败的发生频率,但随着地区经济增长、市场发育水平的完善和对外开放的持续深化,市场化主导的价格形成机制有助于抑制腐败产生的权力因素。
[Abstract]:The promotion incentives brought by fiscal decentralization and the expansion of government scale caused by local governments' ability to absorb local resources are the institutional reasons for the frequent corruption of bureaucrats in China. In this paper, the method of dynamic panel differential generalized distance estimation and system generalized distance estimation is used to decentralize provincial power from 1998 to 2010 in China. A study of the relationship between the expansion of government scale and bureaucratic corruption has found that with the gradual growth of local government revenue decentralization and autonomous decentralization, The decentralized promotion championships have encouraged corruption among local officials by strengthening fiscal competition. Decentralization has not only failed to curb the expansion of government scale, but also led to the accumulation of official corruption because of the increased regional monopoly of local governments. At the same time, Chinese bureaucratic corruption has obvious tendency of ratchet effect. The current urbanization strategy and service-oriented government transformation did not help to slow down the frequency of corruption in the early stage, but with the regional economic growth, the improvement of market development level and the continuous deepening of the opening to the outside world, The market-oriented price-forming mechanism is helpful to restrain the power factor of corruption.
【作者单位】：西南交通大学经济管理学院;四川省国家税务局;
【分类号】：D262.6;F812

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