地方财政竞争无效率的实证分析

发布时间：2018-06-05 16:39

本文选题：经济发展指数 + 地方财政竞争　；参考：《财政研究》2017年07期

【摘要】：地方政府间竞争无效率已经引起学术界的高度关注,但以往的研究多从经济增长角度进行研究,对竞争效率状况的判断未必可靠。公共财政支出对经济具有全面作用,不仅对全要素生产率具有重要作用,对于经济稳定以及社会福利具有同等重要的作用。本文构建经济发展指数为标杆,反映公共财政支出对经济社会的综合影响。然后对地方政府公共支出竞争和经济发展指数间的关系进行实证分析,影响为正的为有效率、影响为负的为无效率。实证结果表明地方政府间的公共支出竞争效率存在倒"U"型的非线性趋势,适度的竞争能够产生效率,而过度的竞争会造成效率损失。实证结果还表明,公共财政制度的负向激励导致了地方政府过度竞争行为。进一步完善分税制财政体制是治本之策。
[Abstract]:The inefficiency of competition among local governments has attracted great attention in academic circles, but previous studies have been mostly carried out from the angle of economic growth, and the judgment of competition efficiency is not reliable. Public expenditure has a comprehensive effect on the economy, not only on the total factor productivity, but also on economic stability and social welfare. This paper constructs the economic development index as a benchmark to reflect the comprehensive influence of public finance expenditure on economy and society. Then the relationship between the local government public expenditure competition and the economic development index is empirically analyzed. The effect is positive for efficiency and negative for non-efficiency. The empirical results show that the competitive efficiency of public expenditure among local governments has a non-linear trend of inverted "U" type, moderate competition can produce efficiency, and excessive competition will result in efficiency loss. The empirical results also show that the negative incentives of public finance system lead to excessive competitive behavior of local governments. Further improvement of the financial system of tax sharing is the solution to the root of the problem.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;湖南商学院财政金融学院;
【基金】：教育部重大课题“我国公共财政风险评估及防范对策研究”(10JZD0023) 湖北省地方税收研究中心科研项目“税收竞争效率研究”(sszx201601)资助
【分类号】：F812.7

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