矿产税改革：澳大利亚的政策及政企博弈

发布时间：2018-06-06 08:35

本文选题：澳大利亚 + 矿产业　；参考：《华东师范大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：澳大利亚矿产资源丰富,是世界上最重要的矿产品生产国和出口国之一。矿业在澳经济体系中占有重要地位。近年来,随着国际市场对矿产品的需求持续增长,矿产品价格大幅提升,澳大利亚矿业企业获取了巨额利润。在澳大利亚,矿产资源被视为全体澳大利亚人民的共同财富,政府有权对私人企业自开采这些公共资源所获得的利润征税。而在澳政府看来,现行的税费政策不能适应市场变化以确保矿业利润得到合理分配。基于此,澳大利亚政府调整税收政策,推出了一系列矿产税改革政策。 2010年5月,工党政府启动矿产税改革,首先推出资源超额利润税(RSPT),该方案拟对矿业经营过程中产生的超额利润征收40%的税款。澳大利亚矿业对此方案表示强烈反对,并发动媒体战以对抗新方案实施。在随后的博弈过程中,澳政府落败,资源超额利润税未能实施,此败绩成为时任澳大利亚总理陆克文下台重要原因之一。随后,继任总理吉拉德与矿业企业协商后推出妥协方案：矿产资源租赁税(MRRT),该方案于2012年7月实行。2013年9月,反对党联盟领导人阿博特上台,上任伊始便兑现矿业税收改革承诺,推出法案废除矿产资源租赁税。本文着眼于自2010年起澳大利亚政府开始推行的矿产税改革,对比澳大利亚此前的矿业税收体系,结合澳大利亚自身经济形势以及矿业发展状况,对其改革背景、改革动因、政策特点及其制定过程进行深入探讨。重点关注在改革之初澳大利亚政府推出资源超额利润税的失败经历,以及时任总理下台事件。研究过程基于政府报告、行业协会报告、媒体报道、政策演讲以及民意调查等资料,剖析改革过程中政府与矿业企业之间的利益博弈。本文运用利益相关者理论及企业权力理论解释澳大利亚政府推行改革受阻的原因。结果表明,在政策制定过程中,澳大利亚政府未就政策细节与主要利益相关者(即澳大利亚矿业企业)进行咨询协商,是改革失败的重要原因之一。澳大利亚联邦大选的迫近、矿业在澳大利亚的特殊地位等原因使得矿业企业权力得到有效发挥,同时将工党政府置于改革不利地位。本文的最后部分将就未来的改革政策实施提出合理化建议。
[Abstract]:Australia is rich in mineral resources and is one of the most important mineral producers and exporters in the world. The mining industry occupies an important position in the Australian economic system. Australian mining companies have made huge profits in recent years as international demand for minerals has continued to grow and mineral prices have risen sharply. In Australia, mineral resources are regarded as the common wealth of all Australians, and the government has the right to tax the profits of private companies from exploiting these public resources. In the Australian government's view, the current tax policy can not adapt to market changes to ensure a reasonable distribution of mining profits. Based on this, the Australian government adjusted its tax policy and introduced a series of mineral tax reform policies. In May 2010, the Labour government launched a tax reform on minerals, first introducing a tax on excess profits on resources, which would impose a 40 percent tax on excess profits generated in the course of mining operations. Australian mining strongly opposed the plan and launched a media war against the new plan. In the ensuing game, the Australian government failed to implement a tax on excess profits on resources, which was one of the important reasons why Kevin Rudd, then prime minister, stepped down. Subsequently, the successor Prime Minister Gillard, in consultation with mining companies, launched a compromise: a mineral resources lease tax, MRRTT, which was introduced in July 2012. In September 2013, opposition coalition leader Abbott came to power. As soon as he took office, he made good on his promise of tax reform and introduced a bill to abolish the mineral resource lease tax. This paper focuses on the mineral tax reform that has been implemented by the Australian government since 2010, compares Australia's previous mining tax system, combines Australia's own economic situation and mining development situation, and gives the background of the reform and the reasons for the reform. The characteristics of the policy and its formulation process are discussed in depth. The focus was on the failure of the Australian government to introduce a tax on excess profits on resources at the start of the reforms and the ouster of the then prime minister. The research process is based on government reports, industry association reports, media reports, policy speeches and public opinion surveys to analyze the interests of the government and mining enterprises in the reform process. This paper uses stakeholder theory and corporate power theory to explain why the Australian government has been blocked from carrying out the reform. The results show that the failure of the Australian government to consult the major stakeholders (i.e. Australian mining enterprises) on the details of the policy is one of the important reasons for the failure of the reform. The approaching federal election and the special status of the mining industry in Australia make the mining industry power exert effectively and put the Labor government at a disadvantage of reform. The last part of this article will put forward the rationalization suggestion of the reform policy implementation in the future.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F816.11

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