基于博弈论视角下提高税务稽查质量的对策研究

发布时间：2018-06-15 03:32

本文选题：税务稽查 + 博弈　；参考：《内蒙古大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：寻找税务稽查中博弈问题的均衡解,对于税务稽查人员正确认识税收筹划、帮助企业提高税务实务能力、在行业内形成良好纳税风气及政府制定税收政策都有积极的意义。本文运用博弈论、行为经济学等的基本原理和模型,结合税务稽查理论、行为经济学、管理学等内容,采用动态双向博弈模型和加入委托代理机’构的基本博弈模型进行分析,根据模型结果得出纳税人逃税所得、委托代理机构行贿概率及税务稽查机关罚款数额等多个经济学指数之间的相互关系,推导出作为不同的税务活动主体在纳税过程中的条件与选择,寻找到活动主体之间追求的均衡解。决策过程中,纳税主体、税务机关和委托代理机构会围绕税务稽查成功率、贿赂成本、处罚金额等因素作出有利于自身的分析决策。该博弈模型可以为税务稽查机关制定政策、制止非法纳税行为、引导建立良好纳税环境提供良好的理论依据。本文最后针对税务机关、纳税人和委托代理机构分别提出了诸如改善稽查方法、运用激励机制抑制委托代理机构及稽查人员涉税风险、采取举报保护机制提高纳税人监督积极性、降低稽查成本等提高稽查效率和效果的措施和建议。
[Abstract]:Finding a balanced solution to the game problem in tax inspection is of positive significance for tax inspectors to correctly understand tax planning, to help enterprises improve their ability in tax practice, to form a good tax atmosphere in the industry and to formulate tax policies by the government. This paper applies the basic principles and models of game theory, behavioral economics, tax audit theory, behavioral economics, management and so on, and adopts the dynamic two-way game model and the basic game model with principal-agent machine. According to the results of the model, the relationship between the taxpayer's tax evasion income, the probability of paying bribes and the amount of the fine of the tax inspection authority is obtained. This paper deduces the conditions and choices in the process of tax payment as different subjects of tax activity, and finds out the equilibrium solution pursued between them. In the decision-making process, tax payers, tax authorities and agency agencies will make favorable analysis decisions around the success rate of tax audit, the cost of bribery, the amount of punishment and so on. The game model can provide a good theoretical basis for the tax inspection authorities to formulate policies, stop illegal tax paying behavior, and guide the establishment of a good tax environment. Finally, aiming at tax authorities, tax payers and principal-agent organizations, this paper puts forward some methods such as improving auditing methods and using incentive mechanism to restrain the tax-related risks of entrustment agencies and inspectors. Measures and suggestions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of audit are put forward, such as improving the enthusiasm of taxpayers' supervision and reducing the cost of audit.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D922.22;F812.42;F224.32

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