生态转移支付对地方政府环境治理的激励效应——基于东部六省46个地级市的经验证据

发布时间：2018-06-16 10:17

本文选题：生态转移支付 + 环境决策响应函数　；参考：《财经研究》2015年02期

【摘要】：文章基于我国财政分权体制下生态转移支付为地方政府环境治理提供激励创新政策工具并已开展实践探索的现实背景,从区分各省不同的激励方式入手,采用东部六省46个地级市2005-2010年的样本数据,在构建地方政府响应函数的基础上,利用空间计量模型识别出这项制度创新对城市环境治理的激励效应。研究表明:(1)"奖励型"和"惩罚型"两种不同的激励方式产生了不同的制度效果,前者有助于提升环境投入,后者有助于强化环境规制。此外,采取直接筹资和一般性拨款对激励效果也具有促进作用。(2)地区间恶性环境竞争、高污染行业比重过大和地方财政能力不足都会阻碍制度效果的产生,其负面效应甚至可能超过生态转移支付的正面作用。这说明现行体制限制了生态转移支付激励作用的发挥。(3)目标协调和制度设计是提高激励效果的关键,目标协调应以扩大地方政府生态服务职能和弱化"牺牲环境换取增长"的动机为先导,制度设计应以提高地方政府治理意愿和治理能力为根本。
[Abstract]:Based on the realistic background that ecological transfer payment under the fiscal decentralization system provides local governments with innovative policy tools for environmental governance and has been explored in practice, the paper starts with distinguishing different incentives from different provinces. Based on the sample data of 46 prefectural cities in six eastern provinces from 2005 to 2010 and based on the construction of local government response function, this paper identifies the incentive effect of this system innovation on urban environmental governance by using spatial econometric model. The research shows that the two different incentive ways of "reward" and "punishment" have different institutional effects. The former helps to enhance environmental input and the latter helps to strengthen environmental regulation. In addition, direct financing and general allocation can also promote the incentive effect.) malignant environmental competition among regions. Excessive proportion of highly polluting industries and insufficient local financial capacity will hinder the generation of institutional effects. The negative effects may even outweigh the positive effects of ecological transfer payments. This shows that the current system limits the incentive function of ecological transfer payment. The coordination of objectives and the design of the system are the key to improve the incentive effect. The goal coordination should be guided by expanding the ecological service function of local government and weakening the motive of "sacrificing the environment for growth", and the system design should be based on improving the local government's governance will and ability.
【作者单位】：浙江财经大学财政与公共管理学院;上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院;
【基金】：教育部重大课题攻关项目(12JZD032)
【分类号】：X321;F812.45

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