财政分权不充分、竞争策略扭曲与社会救助支出:内在逻辑与中国的实际

发布时间：2018-06-18 05:54

本文选题：竞争策略 + 财政分权　；参考：《社会保障研究》2015年02期

【摘要】：自1994年以来,由于分税制改革不充分,地方政府无相对独立的税权,不能独立的设置税种、税率,使得地方政府在税收方面缺乏较大的收入来源,而评估地方政府绩效与本地经济发展水平是以GDP的增长率为标尺,从而导致地方政府支出结构的扭曲——经济增长的竞争策略。结果导致社会救助支出的比重反而不断下降。经验分析表明这一格局存在加强的趋势。我们认为,应该赋予地方政府更多的财政收入权,而限制其过多的财政支配权,应该加入其他方面的考核指标,以"绿色GDP"、政府在公共支出和公共服务等领域内所做出的成绩,作为评估参考地方政府官员晋升的标准。
[Abstract]:Since 1994, because of the inadequate reform of the tax distribution system, the local governments have no relatively independent tax power, and cannot independently set up taxes and tax rates, which makes the local governments lack a large source of revenue in the area of taxation. The evaluation of local government performance and the level of local economic development is based on the GDP growth rate, which leads to the distortion of local government expenditure structure-the competitive strategy of economic growth. As a result, the proportion of social assistance spending has been declining. Empirical analysis shows that this pattern has a trend of strengthening. We believe that local governments should be given more fiscal revenue rights, and that they should be restricted from excessive fiscal control. They should also include other indicators of assessment in terms of "green GDP", the achievements made by the government in areas such as public expenditure and public services. The criteria for the promotion of local government officials as a reference for evaluation.
【作者单位】：南京财经大学公共管理学院、城市发展研究院;武汉大学社会保障研究中心;
【基金】：江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目江苏省“青蓝工程”资助项目江苏省333工程资助国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71003045)成果
【分类号】：F812.2;D632.1

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