财政分权、政绩偏好和地方官员腐败研究

发布时间：2018-07-03 19:44

本文选题：财政分权 + 晋升锦标赛　；参考：《世界经济文汇》2015年03期

【摘要】：本文在晋升锦标赛框架下,研究财政分权、政绩偏好与地方官员腐败之间的关系。与现有文献认为财政分权对腐败产生单向影响不同,本文考察了财政分权对腐败的非线性影响。本文在传统研究公共支出的内生经济增长模型中引入腐败因素,建立了一个包含家庭、厂商以及中央和地方政府在内的一般均衡模型,我们发现财政分权对腐败呈现倒U型影响,且这一关系受到地方政府对经济绩效偏好程度的影响。进一步地,使用中国30个省1998—2010年间面板数据进行实证分析,证实了以上理论假说,即:当财政分权程度较低时,分权会恶化腐败问题,但政绩偏好的提高能够弱化这一恶化效应;而当财政分权较高时,分权会缓解腐败问题,而政绩偏好又可以放大这一缓解效应。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization, performance preference and corruption of local officials under the framework of promotion championship. This paper investigates the nonlinear influence of fiscal decentralization on corruption, which is different from the existing literature that fiscal decentralization has a unidirectional effect on corruption. This paper introduces the corruption factor into the traditional endogenous economic growth model of public expenditure, and establishes a general equilibrium model including households, firms and central and local governments. We find that fiscal decentralization has a negative U-shaped effect on corruption, and this relationship is influenced by the degree of local governments' preference for economic performance. Furthermore, empirical analysis using panel data from 30 Chinese provinces between 1998 and 2010 confirms the theoretical hypothesis that decentralization will worsen corruption when fiscal decentralization is low. However, the improvement of performance preference can weaken this deterioration effect, and when fiscal decentralization is high, decentralization will alleviate the problem of corruption, and performance preference can amplify the mitigation effect.
【作者单位】：上海新金融研究院;复旦大学经济学院;上海财经大学统计与管理学院;中国工商银行上海分行;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:11271242、71371116) 上海财经大学研究生创新基金(项目编号:CXJJ-2013-455) 上海新金融研究院的科研资助
【分类号】：D630.9;F812.2

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