一事一议财政奖补制度对村级公共投资项目的影响

发布时间：2018-07-22 13:30

【摘要】：一事一议财政奖补制度是建设农村公共基础设施和获取村级公益事业项目资金的重要来源渠道,是我国农村公共产品供给制度的重大创新。运用贯序博弈和嵌套博弈理论,分析了一事一议财政奖补制度对于村级公共产品供给的影响,并通过对辽宁省125个村的问卷调查,分析了该制度对村级公共产品供给项目数的影响。零堆积负二项回归结果显示:(1)在最近3年内,获得过一事一议财政奖补的村比未获得一事一议财政奖补的村平均多提供约1.3项村级公共产品;(2)邻里关系越和谐、以往提供的公共产品供给质量越高、"一事一议"后期管护越完善、村干部提供公共产品的意识越强,提供的村级公共产品项目数越多;(3)没有发现农户人均纯收入和户数对村级公共产品提供项目数有显著影响。
[Abstract]:The system of financial award and compensation is an important source channel for building rural public infrastructure and obtaining funds for village public welfare projects. It is also a major innovation in the supply system of rural public goods in China. By using sequential game theory and nested game theory, this paper analyzes the influence of financial award and supplement system on the supply of village public goods, and through the questionnaire survey of 125 villages in Liaoning province, This paper analyzes the influence of this system on the number of supply items of village public goods. The results of zero accumulation negative binomial regression show that: (1) in the last three years, the average number of villages that have received a financial award for one thing or another has increased by about 1.3 items compared with those who have not received a financial award; (2) the more harmonious the neighborhood relationship, the more harmonious the neighborhood relationship is. The higher the supply quality of public goods provided in the past, the more perfect the management and protection of "one matter one discussion", and the stronger the awareness of village cadres to provide public goods. (3) it is not found that the per capita net income and the number of households have a significant impact on the number of public goods provided by the village.
【作者单位】：沈阳农业大学经济管理学院;中国社会科学院人口与劳动经济研究所;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71203146,71573179) 2014年辽宁省高等学校优秀人才支持计划(WJQ2014016) 辽宁省农业领域青年科技创新人才培养计划(2014055)
【分类号】：F812.8

【相似文献】