基于BOOST模式的已建社区养老设施补贴定价机制研究

发布时间：2018-10-16 21:13

【摘要】：随着中国老龄化问题的凸显,养老设施供给严重不足,但由政府投资进行养老设施开发会带给政府巨大的财政压力,政府亟需引入社会资本参与其开发,政企合作进行养老设施开发已成为趋势。在已建社区配套开发养老设施是解决社区养老问题的有效途径,其依托社区资源并直接服务于社区老年群体的开发方式针对性强。然而,由于养老设施的低收益性,私营机构不一定能通过运营养老设施获取目标利润,政府的补贴就成为了影响养老设施持续供给的关键。在此基础上,本文立足于公共政策视角,深入分析了基于BOOST的养老设施开发模式,构建了养老设施补贴定价模型,以实现各参与方的利益均衡,保障养老设施社会福利性的同时保持其供给的稳定性,推动养老设施开发的持续健康发展。首先,分析了养老设施BOOST模式的融资结构及其开发流程,并从政府财政、社会资本投资和私营机构融资的角度出发,对BOOST开发动因及开发效用进行阐述。同时,对作为“管制者”的政府及由开发商、投资商和运营商组成的私营机构进行职能分析。在此基础上,分析了BOOST模式的运作条件及运作思路,设计了“改造+新建”的运作模式,该模式有效降低了私营机构开发成本,进而降低养老设施价格。其次,基于市场供需理论、社会保障理论和“帕累托最优”理论对养老设施价值形成进行分析,梳理了基于项目成本、项目期望收益和项目实际收益的养老设施价格构成,厘清了政府对养老设施项目的补贴构成。在此基础上,采用以二部定价法为主的成本导向定价法和支付能力导向定价法,结合养老设施价格构成中的补偿性收益,构建了养老设施BOOST模式综合定价模型。在养老设施定价的基础上,分别构建政府对私营机构的一次性床位补贴、基于公正报酬率定价的运营补贴及经营性养老服务补贴模型,结合政府对老年用户补贴模型,综合构建了政府对养老设施项目补贴定价模型。再次,养老设施以保障老年用户基本养老权益为根本目的,为了避免私营机构提高养老设施价格,设定了养老设施低价规制策略及补贴修正模型;基于不完全信息静态博弈理论,分别对私营机构和政府进行低价规制策略分析,厘清了低价规制的实施手段和激励作用;基于低价规制建立私营机构三级成本绩效评估体系,构建以成本绩效规制为导向的养老设施补贴修正模型。最后,以徐州市奎园社区养老服务项目为原型,结合研究中的养老设施定价模型及补贴定价模型进行实证了分析。实证研究得出BOOST模式下运作的养老设施价格处于徐州市养老市场的较低水平,能有效保障养老用户的基本养老权益。政府对私营机构的经济补贴使其能获取目标利润,政府对老年用户的补贴进一步保障其养老权益。
[Abstract]:With the aging problem in China, the supply of pension facilities is seriously insufficient, but the development of pension facilities invested by the government will bring huge financial pressure to the government. The government urgently needs to introduce social capital to participate in its development. Government-enterprise cooperation in the development of pension facilities has become a trend. Developing endowment facilities in established communities is an effective way to solve the problem of providing for the aged in the community, which relies on the resources of the community and serves the elderly groups in the community directly. However, due to the low profitability of pension facilities, private institutions may not be able to obtain the target profits through the operation of pension facilities. Government subsidies have become the key to the sustainable supply of pension facilities. On this basis, based on the perspective of public policy, this paper deeply analyzes the development model of pension facilities based on BOOST, and constructs the pricing model of pension facilities subsidies, in order to achieve the benefit balance of the participants. To ensure the social welfare of pension facilities and maintain the stability of their supply, promote the sustainable and healthy development of pension facilities. Firstly, this paper analyzes the financing structure and development process of BOOST model, and expounds the development motivation and utility of BOOST from the perspectives of government finance, social capital investment and private sector financing. At the same time, the government as a "regulator" and the private sector, composed of developers, investors and operators, are analyzed. On this basis, the operating conditions and operation ideas of BOOST mode are analyzed, and the operation mode of "reform and new construction" is designed, which effectively reduces the development cost of private institutions and then reduces the price of old-age facilities. Secondly, based on the theory of market supply and demand, social security theory and Pareto optimal theory, this paper analyzes the formation of the value of old-age facilities, combing the price structure of pension facilities based on project cost, project expected income and project actual income. It clarifies the composition of the government's subsidy to pension facilities. On this basis, a comprehensive pricing model of old-age facilities based on BOOST model is constructed by adopting the cost-oriented pricing method and the pay-ability oriented pricing method, which are mainly based on the two-part pricing method, and combined with the compensatory income in the price composition of the old-age facilities. On the basis of the pricing of old-age facilities, the one-off bed subsidy, the operating subsidy based on fair rate of return and the operating pension service subsidy model are constructed, respectively, and combined with the government subsidy model for the elderly users. The model of government subsidy pricing for pension facilities is constructed. Thirdly, the basic purpose of the old-age facilities is to protect the basic rights and interests of the elderly users. In order to avoid the private sector to raise the price of pension facilities, the paper sets up the low-price regulation strategy and the subsidy revision model of the old-age facilities. Based on the static game theory of incomplete information, this paper analyzes the low price regulation strategy of private sector and government, and clarifies the implementation means and incentive function of low price regulation. Based on the low price regulation, the third level cost performance evaluation system of private sector is established. This paper constructs a revised model of pension facility subsidy based on cost performance regulation. Finally, based on the prototype of the community pension service project in Kuiyuan, Xuzhou City, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the pricing model of pension facilities and subsidy pricing model. Empirical research shows that the price of pension facilities operating under the BOOST model is at a low level of the pension market in Xuzhou, which can effectively protect the basic pension rights and interests of the aged users. Government subsidies to the private sector enable them to obtain targeted profits, and government subsidies to elderly users further protect their pension rights and interests.
【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F812.45;D669.6

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