邻里竞争、财政分权与政府财政支出偏向研究——基于三层分权框架的角度
发布时间：2018-11-26 07:26
【摘要】：通过利用空间面板Durbi n模型,实证检验了中国省及省以下财政分权对财政支出偏向政策的影响。研究发现,总体上,省级财政分权促使地方政府增加了基本建设性支出比重,而减少了社会发展性支出的比重,省以下财政分权对财政支出结构效应则正好相反。相邻地区GDP增长率的提高,促使地方政府增加基本建设性支出比重,而降低社会发展性支出比重。地方政府在财政支出竞争上同时出现了攀比效应和逐底竞争效应。因此,纠正地方政府支出偏向政策,必须推动政府绩效考评体系改革和财政体制改革。
[Abstract]:By using the spatial panel Durbi n model, this paper empirically examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on the policy of fiscal expenditure bias in China. It is found that, on the whole, provincial fiscal decentralization promotes the local government to increase the proportion of capital construction expenditure, but reduces the proportion of social development expenditure, but the effect of fiscal decentralization on the structure of fiscal expenditure is just the opposite. The increase of GDP growth rate in neighboring regions urges local governments to increase the proportion of capital construction expenditure and reduce the proportion of social development expenditure. At the same time, the local government in the financial expenditure competition has the effect of comparison and bottom-down competition. Therefore, to correct the policy of local government expenditure bias, we must promote the reform of government performance appraisal system and fiscal system.
【作者单位】： 华南理工大学经济与贸易学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目“空间统计学在中国城市和区域经济发展格局及演变规律研究中的应用”(12CTJ009) 教育部人文社会科学基金项目“省管县财政体制背景下省以下财政分权、转移支付对县域政府行为影响实证研究”(12YJC790125)
【分类号】：F812.45
[Abstract]:By using the spatial panel Durbi n model, this paper empirically examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on the policy of fiscal expenditure bias in China. It is found that, on the whole, provincial fiscal decentralization promotes the local government to increase the proportion of capital construction expenditure, but reduces the proportion of social development expenditure, but the effect of fiscal decentralization on the structure of fiscal expenditure is just the opposite. The increase of GDP growth rate in neighboring regions urges local governments to increase the proportion of capital construction expenditure and reduce the proportion of social development expenditure. At the same time, the local government in the financial expenditure competition has the effect of comparison and bottom-down competition. Therefore, to correct the policy of local government expenditure bias, we must promote the reform of government performance appraisal system and fiscal system.
【作者单位】： 华南理工大学经济与贸易学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目“空间统计学在中国城市和区域经济发展格局及演变规律研究中的应用”(12CTJ009) 教育部人文社会科学基金项目“省管县财政体制背景下省以下财政分权、转移支付对县域政府行为影响实证研究”(12YJC790125)
【分类号】：F812.45
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